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Abstract
COVID-19 has revealed several limitations of existing mechanisms for rationing scarce
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values such as equity by discriminating against disadvantaged communities. Illustrating that
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rationing of medical resources as a new application of market design and propose a reserve
system as a resolution. We develop a general theory of reserve design, introduce new concepts
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“If you fail to plan, you are planning to fail.”
— Benjamin Franklin
1 Introduction
Agencies responsible for public health, medical and emergency preparedness at the international,
national, regional, and hospital level all have proposed guidelines for allocating scarce medical
resources in crisis situations. These situations range from wartime triage medicine to public
health emergencies, such as influenza pandemics and COVID-19. In 2005, the World Health
Organization warned of a severe influenza pandemic and advised countries to develop pandemic
guidelines and triage protocols (WHO, 2005). While the nature of the resources in short supply
depends on the crisis situation, for influenza and COVID-19, they may include ventilators, anti-
viral medications, and potential vaccines.
How to implement a rationing system during a crisis situation presents a complicated ques-
tion rife with ethical concerns. Rationing guidelines typically start by articulating several dif-
ferent ethical principles. These principles include equity, which is fair distribution of benefits
and burdens; utilitarianism, which involves maximizing welfare; reciprocity, which is respecting
contributions others have made in the past; instrumental valuation, which is respecting con-
tributions others could make in the future; solidarity, which is fellowship with other members
of society; non-discrimination, which is requiring that certain individual characteristics such as
gender, race, and age play no role allocation. Rationing guidelines also emphasize procedural
values, such as accountability, reasonableness, and transparency (see, e.g., WHO (2007); Prehn
and Vawter (2008); Emanuel et al. (2020); Truog, Mitchell and Daley (2020)).
After articulating these values, regional or national guidelines propose a way to operationalize
them with an allocation mechanism. The most common system used in these guidelines is a
priority system which places patients into a single priority order, and allocates all units based
on this single priority. For example, 2018 US Centers for Disease Control Vaccine Allocation
guideline place patients into one of four tiers based on their role in providing homeland and
national security, providing health care and community support services, maintaining critical
infrastructure, and being a member of the general population (CDC, 2018). In some cases
priority orders are obtained through an objective scoring method, resulting in a priority point
system. This is especially common for rationing of ICU beds and ventilators. For example,
Piscitello et al. (2020) reports that 19 states have adopted priority point systems based on the
Sequential Organ Failure Assessments (SOFA) score, a scoring method that measures severity
of organ dysfunction in six organ systems where higher aggregate scores are associated with
elevated mortality risk.
The COVID-19 pandemic has spurred renewed interest in these guidelines and has revealed
several important limitations of the existing allocation mechanisms. Whether it is about ra-
tioning of ventilators, antiviral drugs or vaccines, a common theme in many of these debates is
that existing guidelines and allocation mechanisms have given up on various important ethical
values. For example, advocates for disadvantaged groups voice opposition to priority point sys-
tems which use survival probabilities based on various proxies such as the SOFA score. They
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argue that these criteria are discriminatory for they fail to acknowledge pre-existing discrimi-
nation in access to health care (Schmidt, 2020). From March-June 13, 2020, the age-adjusted
COVID-19 hospitalization rate of non-hispanic blacks is 178 per 100,000, which is more than
four times that of non-hispanic whites (CDC, 2020). Moreover, disparate access to testing for
disadvantaged groups have also increased COVID-19 prevalence in these communities, further
elevating their disadvantage. Similarly, disabilities’ advocates voice opposition to rationing plans
based solely on survival probabilities. Some of them reject a detailed triage protocol in favor of
random selection (Ne’eman, 2020). In their view, such criteria are inherently discriminatory for
certain types of disabled patients.
In this paper, we argue that several shortcomings of the existing rationing systems are a
direct consequence of restricting allocation mechanisms to priority systems. This restriction
imposes a single priority order of individuals for allocation of all units. This limiting feature
of a priority system compromises its ability to represent a variety of ethical considerations. A
remedy must therefore break this characteristic. We propose an alternative way to accommodate
multiple ethical principles through a reserve system. In a reserve system, units are divided into
multiple categories each representing an ethical value or a balance of multiple ethical values.
Rather than relying on a single priority order of individuals for allocation of all units, a distinct
priority order is used to prioritize individuals for units of each category. This heterogeneity
allows for accommodating the desired ethical values without the need to aggregate them into a
single metric or into a strict lexicographic hierarchy.
The flexibility of a reserve system over a priority system can help reach compromises for
several ongoing polarizing debates. For example, many argue that disadvantaged groups or
under-represented minorities should be given priority access for a COVID-19 vaccine. This is a
significant departure from the recommended priority tiers in the 2018 CDC Vaccine allocation
guideline. Others question whether prioritizing these groups would erode public trust in vacci-
nation. For more on this debate, see Ducharme (2020), McCaughey (2020), and Twohey (2020).
While there is no middle ground for compromise under a priority system, a compromise can be
reached through a reserve system by giving disadvantaged communities preferential treatment
for a fraction of vaccines. In Section 5, we present other examples of how a reserve system can
help reach compromises in other debates.
Reserve systems have an important precedent in medicine for deceased donor kidney allo-
cation. Until 2014, the U.S. Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network (OPTN) used a
priority system to allocate deceased donor kidneys (OPTN, 2014). After establishing medical
compatibility, patients were ordered by priority type, and then priority points, with ties broken
by waiting time. In 2014, the OPTN system changed to include a reserve (Israni et al., 2014).
In the reserve, 20% of the highest quality kidneys are reserved for adults with the highest 20%
expected post-transplant survival score (EPTS). A priority points system is used for the remain-
ing kidneys. Parallel to our motive for introducing reserve systems (i.e. better integration of
various ethical principles), OPTN added this reserve to better reflect the ethical principle of
utilitarianism, which was not as prominently captured in the prior system.1
1The New Kidney Allocation System (KAS) Frequently Asked Questions, Organ Procurement and Transplan-
tation Network. Available at https://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/media/1235/kas_faqs.pdf (last accessed on
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In addition to formulating medical rationing as a new application of market design, our paper
also contributes to the theoretical matching literature by developing a general theory of reserve
systems. Beyond our primary application, our results have direct implications for a wide range
of applications such as affirmative action in allocation of public positions or public school seats
and assignment of immigration visas. In the remaining part of this section, we summarize our
contributions to the theory of reserve design.
In our formulation of medical rationing, there is a number of identical medical units to be
allocated to a set of patients. These units can be ICU beds, ventilators, anti-virals, vaccines, or
other scarce vital items. An allocation is a matching of patients either to a reserve category if
the patient receives a unit or the empty set if she does not. Hence, by formulating the medical
rationing problem as an application of reserve design, we do away with the restriction of mapping
all ethical considerations on to a single dimension. Under our formulation, units are placed into
one of a set of reserve categories, each with a distinct priority order of patients. A reserve system
is a generalization of a priority system because units in different reserve categories can prioritize
patients in different ways.
Our formal approach is axiomatic and lays the foundations of reserve systems by specifying
three basic principles any system has to satisfy. First, patients should only receive units for
which they are qualified. Second, no unit from any reserve category should stay idle as long as
there is an eligible patient for that category. Finally, for each category, units should be allocated
based on the priority order of individuals in the category. We see these principles as minimal
requirements, which can be justified on both normative and positive grounds.
In many real-life applications of reserve systems it is customary to announce the outcome of
a reserve system though a specification of the cutoff individual at each category , i.e., the lowest
priority individual who has gained admission through each category.2 The vector of cutoff
individuals identify the budget set for each individual in the sense that they can see through
which (if any) category they can receive a unit. Motivated by this observation, we formalize the
notion of a cutoff equilibrium, a notion akin to a competitive equilibrium. A cutoff equilibrium
is a vector of cutoff individuals together with a matching, where each patient is matched with a
category in her budget set, and any category that has not filled its quota has a cutoff of ∅ (the
counterpart of a price of zero in our model). Our first result not only rationalizes the prevalence
of the use of cutoffs in real-life applications but also the plausibility of our three axioms: A
matching satisfies these three properties if and only if it is supported at a cutoff equilibrium.
Although our first main result provides a full characterization of matchings that satisfy our
three properties, it leaves open the question of how to find matchings supported at cutoff equi-
libria. Just like computing all competitive equilibria often presents challenges except in special
cases, so does the computation of all cutoff equilibria. Our second main result is that matchings
that are supported at cutoff equilibria can be computed by constructing a hypothetical two-sided
matching market where each patient has strict preferences between categories. This construc-
tion is hypothetical because in the original problem the patient only cares about obtaining a
resource and is therefore indifferent between all units. We show that a matching satisfies our
7/20/2020).
2See, for example, Appendix Figure A1.
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three properties if and only if it can be computed as the outcome of the deferred acceptance
algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) for this hypothetical market.
Our link to a hypothetical two-sided matching market provides a great deal of flexibility to
compute outcomes by changing the way patients rank categories under these artificial prefer-
ences. This flexibility has an important drawback: unless there is a systematic way to construct
preferences, practitioners may not value the ability to construct artificial preferences at this
level of generality. For instance, it may be difficult to explain if a patient i is considered first for
an unreserved category and then for an essential personnel category, whereas another patient j
with similar characteristics is considered for these categories in the reverse order. We therefore
focus on an intuitive subclass of matchings, known as sequential reserve matchings, in which
reserve categories are processed in sequence in a particular order. The set of sequential reserve
matchings is a refinement of the set of cutoff matchings. Within this class, we show that the
earlier a category is processed, the higher is the maximum cutoff. Intuitively this means that
the earlier a category is processed the more competitive it becomes.
We then turn to a special environment where there is a baseline priority order. This special
environment, which is the focus of much of the earlier literature on reserve systems, is widespread
in real-life applications where the baseline order may depend on scores on standardized exams,
results of random lotteries, or time of application. For medical rationing the baseline order may
depend on an objective measure of expected health outcome such as the SOFA score.3 There is
an unreserved category in which all patients are beneficiaries and the priority order is the same as
the baseline. Any other category is a preferential treatment category, with a set of beneficiaries,
and all beneficiaries of a category are prioritized over patients who are not, but otherwise their
relative priority order is the same as the baseline. If each patient is a beneficiary of at most one
preferential treatment category, and there are not more than five categories, every beneficiary
of the preferential treatment category who is matched when a category c is processed earlier is
also matched when it is processed later. This result substantially generalizes earlier results on
reserve processing to several categories, while also showing the limit of obtaining sharp formal
results for more than five categories.
Finally, we turn to one possible shortcoming of certain sequential reserve matchings: some
of the sequential reserve matchings can be Pareto dominated by others. This shortcoming
is a direct consequence of the mechanical allocation of patients into reserve categories under
sequential reserve matching when they clear the cutoffs for multiple categories. We therefore
introduce an additional principle requiring a “smart” allocation of reserves in these situations,
maximizing the accommodation of intended beneficiaries of reserves. This property together with
non-wastefulness imply Pareto efficiency. We conclude our theoretical analysis by introducing
an algorithm that produces a range of “smart” reserve matchings with the desired properties.
The rest of paper organized as follows. Section 2 presents some additional background on
widespread use of priority systems for emergency rationing of medical resources and identifies
3The European Society of Intensive Care Medicine devised the SOFA score at a consensus meeting in October
1994 in Paris, France (Vincent et al., 1996). Each of six organ systems – lungs, liver, brain, kidneys, blood
clotting, and blood pressure – is independently assigned a score of 1 to 4. The SOFA score sums these six scores,
and sicker patients are assigned higher scores. While not initially designed as a prognostic score, subsequent
research supports its use for that end (Jones, Trzeciak and Kline, 2009).
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several shortcomings of these systems. Section 3 presents our formal model of reserve systems,
states our main two characterization results, and introduces sequential reserve matchings. Sec-
tion 4 specializes the model to one with a baseline priority order, develops comparative static
results, and formulates and studies smart reserve matchings. It also relates our findings to earlier
literature on reserve systems. Section 5 discusses how a reserve system can help with several
medical rationing debates and some other practical aspects of medical rationing. The paper
concludes in Section 6. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Priority versus Reserve Systems for Pandemic Rationing
2.1 Background on Priority Systems
The most common allocation mechanism for medical rationing is a priority system where units
are allocated to patients based on a single priority order. This priority order captures the ethical
values guiding the allocation of the scarce medical resource. An example is the 2005 US National
Vaccine Advisory Committee plan. This guideline places patients into the following tiers: Tier
1A: Health Care Workers, Tier 1B: Highest-Risk Groups, Tier 1C: Household contacts and
pregnancy, Tier 1D: Pandemic responders, Tier 2A: Other high-risk groups, Tier 2B: Critical
infrastructure groups, Tier 3: Other key government health care decision-makers, and Tier 4:
Healthy patients between 2 to 64 years without any high-risk conditions. Within each group,
all patients have equal priority. These guidelines were drafted following the 2004-05 influenza
vaccine shortage in the United States (Temte, 2006).
In some of the applications, most notably for allocation of ventilators and ICU beds, the
underlying priority order is obtained through a monotonic scoring function. Such a refinement
of a priority system is called a priority point system. Under this system, each ethical value
is represented with a monotonic function. Values are then integrated with an additive formula,
which produces an aggregate point score for each patient. The claims of patients over medical
resources are determined based on their point scores, with a lower score typically indicating a
higher claim. Often a priority score is coarsened into tiers, and all patients in the same tier have
the same claim. Tie-breaking within a tier is typically based on clinical criteria or lotteries.
A single-principle point system is a priority point system based on only one ethical value.
The 2015 New York State Ventilator Guideline is a prominent example. In the system, as a
first step certain patients are deemed ineligible. The remaining patients are ordered based on
estimated mortality risk, which is re-evaluated every 48 hours (Zucker et al., 2015). Mortality
risk is measured by the Sequential Organ Failure Assessment (SOFA) score which places patients
into priority tiers. In cases of excess demand among members of a given priority tier, New York
and other proposals recommend random allocation – a lottery – among equal-priority patients
(Zucker et al., 2015; Emanuel et al., 2020).
Several bioethicists and clinicians criticize single-principle priority point systems solely based
on SOFA for ignoring multiple ethical values. These critics emphasize the need to integrate a
variety of ethical values and advocate for a multi-principle approach, see, e.g., White et al.
(2009) and Daugherty-Biddison et al. (2017). White et al. (2009) describe a multi-principle
priority point system where several ethical values are placed on a numerical scale and summed
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up across ethical values to arrive at a single number. Variants of the system shown in Table 1
have become the leading multi-principle priority point system for ventilators.4
Table 1 shows how the ethical values of saving the most lives, saving the most years of life,
and the life-cycle principle are integrated through an additive formula. As an example, consider
a hypothetical patient with a SOFA score of seven. She obtains two points based on the ethical
value of saving the most lives. If the patient has no chronic diseases or comorbidities and is
between 61-74 years old, she obtains four more points based on the other two ethical values
yielding a total of six. A patient with a lower total point score has a higher priority for the
resource than a patient with a higher total point score.5 More than half of US states use either
a single- or multiple-principle priority point system (Whyte, 2020).
2.2 Challenges with Priority Systems
While practical, priority systems have a number of important limitations. A priority system may
fail to integrate different ethical values because of incommensurability.6 For example, the ethical
values of saving the most lives and the life-cycle principle in Table 1 are incommensurable values,
making it hard to interpret the role of these values under the priority point system in Table 1. In
addition, various ethical values have implications on group composition, and a priority system
lacks the flexibility to accommodate these considerations. In many cases, these challenges have
led to the exclusion of some of ethical values all together. For these reasons, priority systems are
4As of April 24, 2020, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania have
adopted variants of this system. de Pu Kamp, Devine and Griffin (2020) reports that several hundred hospitals
around the country have adopted this system.
5Most protocols specifies a tie-breaker between patients with identical total points, although the South Carolina
protocol fails to provide one.
6In ethics, two values are incommensurable when they do not share a common standard of measurement.
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often ill-defined for medical rationing and not usable. We elaborate on several of these points
next, focusing on several debates on rationing of ventilators and ICU beds. Since virtually all
states with guidelines recommend priority point systems, we present the shortcomings of these
mechanisms.7 Many of these shortcomings are shared by priority systems in general.
2.2.1 Failure to Represent the Desired Ethical Values
A priority point system requires that ethical values be mapped to a single linear order. However,
there are some ethical principles where the claims of patients cannot be represented with a
monotonic function. One example is group-based policies, such as those related to regions or
gender. For example, the European Union has proposed balanced participation of women and
men in political and public decision making by requiring that at least 40% of public offices are
held by women and at least 40% are held by men (Dittmar, 2018; Rankin, 2020). For medical
rationing, it is possible that a future pandemic is so devastating that it threatens a significant
portion of the human race. In such a hypothetical crisis, a principle based on survival of the
species may suggest a similar constraint. A guideline may recommend to allocate at least 40%
of vital resources to female patients and at least 40% to male patients. Clearly, considerations
based on group composition cannot be represented with a function that relies only on individual
attributes. Similarly, a priority point system cannot accommodate a guideline that wishes to
allocate resources to disabled citizens in proportion to their representation in society.
When constructing priority points and incorporating multiple ethical values, a priority point
system norms or scales different and potentially incommensurable ethical principles into one
dimension. These challenges are like the usual ones associated with aggregating social alterna-
tives into a single ordering based on multiple inputs – a situation which involves “comparing
apples to oranges.” The debate on how rationing guidelines should compare claims of children
versus adults illustrates this issue. Massachusetts guidelines state that indicators that feed into
scores for adults are not reliable for children (Bateman et al., 2020). They explain that “scoring
systems that are meaningful for adult critical care patients do not apply to pediatric patients or
newborns.” As a result, the Massachusetts guidelines use a different scoring system for children.
However, their point system then uses a single priority point system to evaluate all patients
together. This decision ends up comparing the point scores of children with those of adults.
Third, the fact that all resources are ordered using a single uniform priority order can
result in the exclusion of certain ethical values. An example of this phenomenon appears in
the debate about prioritizing essential personnel. Many groups argue that essential personnel,
and especially frontline healthcare workers, should receive priority allocation of scarce resources
under triage scenarios. This view is also strongly endorsed by medical ethicists based on the
backward-looking principle of reciprocity and the forward-looking principle of instrumental value
(Emanuel et al., 2020). Nevertheless, states such as New York State and Minnesota had to give
up on this consideration, largely due to concerns about the extreme scenarios where no units
may remain for the rest of the society. One of the reasons offered in Vawter et al. (2010) by the
Minnesota Pandemic Working group is as follows:
7As of July 2020, the only exception is Michigan which recommends a priority system with a lexicographic
hierarchy between several tiers of patients.
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... it is possible that they [key workers] would use most, if not all, of the short supply of
ventilators; other groups systematically would be deprived access.
The New York State Task Force also struggled with this topic, recognizing the need to provide
“insurance” for frontline health workers (Zucker et al., 2015). However, they ultimately decided
against it, stating:
Expanding the category of privilege to include all the workers listed above may mean
that only health care workers obtain access to ventilators in certain communities. This
approach may leave no ventilators for community members, including children; this al-
ternative was unacceptable to the Task Force.
For both states, a limitation of priority systems resulted in completely giving up these ethical
values. It is important to emphasize that these concerns are direct consequences of the mechanics
of a priority system where providing preferential access to any group for any portion of the
resources means giving preferential treatment for all of them.
Fourth, a single priority order struggles to integrate the principle of non-exclusion. This
principle is the idea that every patient, no matter his or her circumstances, should have some
hope of obtaining a life-saving resource. In the March 2020 Alabama rationing plan, individuals
with severe or profound mental disabilities were considered “unlikely candidates for ventilator
support.”8 Washington state guidelines recommend that hospital patients with “loss of reserves
in energy, physical ability, cognition and general health” be switched to outpatient or palliative
care (Fink, 2020). In a priority system coupled with excess demand for available resources by
the higher-priority groups – even without any explicit exclusion of certain types of individuals
– there will be some patients in a lower-priority group who would never be treated during a
shortage.
2.2.2 Implementation Issues in Existing Guidelines
These conceptual challenges with a priority point system are reflected in actual design challenges
in several guidelines. We briefly describe three examples.
Massachusetts revised their critical care guidelines on April 7, 2020 for the COVID-19 pan-
demic. Like many guidelines, this document was the result of a committee consisting of medical
experts and ethicists. The guidelines provided an adaption of the system described in Table 1
without the life-cycle consideration. However, after precisely spelling out the priority order with
a table of numbers for each dimension, the document states:
Individuals who perform tasks that are vital to the public health response, including all
those whose work directly to support the provision of care to others, should be given
heightened priority.
This clause provides no further description on how heightened priority is to be implemented.
This lack of transparency contrasts with the level of precision regarding other ethical principles,
and may reflect their inability to arrive at consensus given the underlying priority point system.
8After widespread backlash, this plan was withdrawn on April 9, 2020. Carter (2020) warns that plans which
discriminate against the disabled may violate the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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Crisis standards of care guidelines initially developed in Pittsburgh use a similar adaptation
of the system described in Table 1. They offer a vague description of tie-breakers:
In the event that there are ties in priority scores between patients, life-cycle considerations
will be used as a tiebreaker, with priority going to younger patients, who have had less
opportunity to live through life’s stages. In addition, individuals who perform tasks that
are vital to the public health response – specifically, those whose work directly supports
the provision of acute care to others – will also be given heightened priority (e.g., as a
tiebreaker between identical priority scores)
In their adaptation of Table 1, the designers saw saving the most lives as more justified than
either the life-cycle principle or the instrumental value principle. However, the guidelines did
not choose between these two latter ethical values in the event of tie-breaking.
The third example is from Arizona’s June 6, 2020 update to their allocation framework
(DHS, 2020). This document also offers a table prioritizing patients based on SOFA scores and
whether a patient is expected to live or die within one or five years despite successful treatment
of illness. It then warns that “a situation could arise where limited resources are needed by
two or more patients with the same triage priority scores” in which case “additional factors
may be considered as priorities.” Among the list of additional factors are whether patients
are pediatric patients, first responders or health care workers, single caretakers for minors or
dependent adults, pregnant, or have not had an opportunity to experience life stages. There is
no further detail on how multiple tie-breakers would be implemented.
Beyond these specific updates to guidelines during the COVID-19 pandemic, there are also
concerns that incomplete descriptions have rendered such guidelines ineffective in other settings.
During the 2004 shortage of the influenza vaccine, Schoch-Spana et al. (2005) state that CDC
guidelines were too general and broad. Specifically,
Local providers thus faced gaps in the local supply of inactivated vaccine as well as the
absence of a priori prioritization standards relevant to initial and evolving local conditions.
Practitioners and local and state health authorities throughout the U.S. faced a similar
predicament.
Despite these vagaries, some state departments of health penalized clinicians if protocols are not
followed. For example, Lee (2004) describes that the Massachusetts threatened a fine or prison
time for whoever violates the CDC order on distribution during the 2004 flu-shot shortage. The
requirement to follow an incompletely specified system places clinicians in a difficult position.
2.3 Reserve Systems
Many of the challenges presented in Section 2.2 stem from one simple but limiting feature of a
priority point system: it relies on a single priority ranking of patients that is identical for all units.
A reserve system eliminates this feature of the mechanism because it allows for heterogeneity of
patient claims over different units.
A reserve system has three main parameters. They are:
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1. a division of all units into multiple segments referred to as reserve categories,9
2. number of units in each of these categories, and
3. specification of a priority order of the patients in each of these categories.
If reserve categories are processed sequentially, as in the case in several real-life applications of
reserve systems, processing order of reserve categories can also be an additional parameter. For
some (or all) of the reserve categories, there can also be exclusion criteria, based on the nature
of the medical resource that is being rationed along with the patient’s clinical assessment. The
priority order of patients for each category also incorporates this information. Reserve categories
can differ either based on the groups to receive higher priority or the combination of ethical
principles to be invoked. The main idea is to use the associated priority order – which embeds
ethical principles – when allocating units in each reserve category. Importantly, the priority
order need not be the same between reserve categories.
A reserve system provides a natural resolution to the representation and implementation
issues discussed in Sections 2.2. However, adoption of a reserve system without a clear un-
derstanding of one important aspect of its implementation can have unintended distributional
consequences.10 When a patient qualifies for a unit through multiple reserve categories, she does
not care through which one she receives a unit. And yet this choice influences the outcome for
other patients. We therefore next present a general theory of reserve systems.
3 A General Theory of Reserve Systems
While our primary application is rationing of scarce medical resources, in this section we provide
a general model of reserve systems which has several other applications including affirmative
action in school choice (Pathak and So¨nmez, 2013; Dur et al., 2018; Correa et al., 2019), college
admissions (Aygu¨n and Bo, 2020; Baswana et al., 2019), assignment of government positions
(So¨nmez and Yenmez, 2019a,b), and skill diversity in immigration visa allocation (Pathak, Rees-
Jones and So¨nmez, 2020). Despite this generality, the terminology is tailored to our main
application.
There is a set of patients I and q identical medical units to allocate. There is a set of
reserve categories C. For every category c ∈ C, rc units are reserved so that
∑
c∈C rc = q.
It is important to emphasize that individual units are not associated with the categories in
our model. The phrase “rc units are reserved” does not mean specific units are set aside for
category c. Rather, it means that for the purposes of accounting, a total of unspecified rc units
are attached to category c.
For every category c ∈ C, there is a linear priority order pic over the set of patients I and
∅. This priority order represents the relative claims of the patients on units in category c as
well as their eligibility for those units. For every category c ∈ C and patient i ∈ I, we say that
9This division is for accounting purposes only, and it does not attach a specific unit to a category.
10See Dur et al. (2018) and Pathak, Rees-Jones and So¨nmez (2020) for real-life examples of this phenomenon
from school choice and H1-B visa allocation.
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patient i is eligible for category c if
i pic ∅.
Given priority order pic, we represent its weak order by pic. That is, for any x, y ∈ I ∪ {∅},
x pic y ⇐⇒ x = y or x pic y.
For our main application of pandemic rationing, pic orders patients based on the balance of
ethical principles guiding the allocation of units in category c.
A matching µ : I → C ∪ {∅} is a function that maps each patient either to a category or
to ∅ such that ∣∣µ−1(c)∣∣ ≤ rc for every category c ∈ C. For any patient i ∈ I, µ(i) = ∅ means
that the patient does not receive a unit and µ(i) = c ∈ C means that the patient receives a unit
reserved for category c. Let M denote the set of matchings.
For any matching µ ∈ M and any subset of patients I ′ ⊆ I, let µ(I ′) denote the set of
patients in I ′ who are matched with a category under matching µ. More formally,
µ(I ′) =
{
i ∈ I ′ : µ(i) ∈ C}.
These are the patients in I ′ who are matched (or equivalently who are assigned units) under
matching µ.
In real-life applications of our model, it is important to allocate the units to qualified in-
dividuals without wasting any and abiding by the priorities governing the allocation of these
units. We next formulate this idea through three axioms:
Definition 1. A matching µ ∈ M complies with eligibility requirements if, for any i ∈ I
and c ∈ C,
µ(i) = c =⇒ i pic ∅.
Our first axiom formulates the idea that units should be awarded only to eligible individuals.
For rationing of vital medical resources, any patient who is eligible for one category must also
be eligible for any category. And if a patient is ineligible for all categories, then this patient
can be dropped from the set of patients. Hence, compliance with eligibility requirements always
holds for our main application.
Definition 2. A matching µ ∈M is non-wasteful if, for any i ∈ I and c ∈ C,
i pic ∅ and µ(i) = ∅ =⇒
∣∣µ−1(c)∣∣ = rc.
Our second axiom formulates the idea that no unit should be wasted. That is, if a unit
remains idle, then there should not be any unmatched individual who is eligible for the unit.
For rationing vital resources, each patient is eligible for all units, and therefore non-wastefulness
in this context corresponds to either matching all the units or all the patients.
Definition 3. A matching µ ∈M respects priorities if, for any i, i′ ∈ I and c ∈ C,
µ(i) = c and µ(i′) = ∅ =⇒ i pic i′.
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Our last axiom formulates the idea that for each category, the units should be allocated
based on the priority order of individuals in this category.
As far as we know, in every real-life application of a reserve system each of these three
axioms are either explicitly or implicitly required. Hence, we see these three axioms as a minimal
requirement for reserve systems. In the next two sections we present two characterizations of
matchings that satisfy these axioms, one through a notion akin to competitive equilibria and
the second based on the celebrated deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962).
3.1 Cutoff Equilibria
In many real-life applications of reserve systems, the outcome is often publicized through a
system that identifies the lowest priority individual that qualifies for admission for each category.
This representation makes it straightforward to verify that an allocation was computed following
the announced policy because an individual can compare her priority to the announced cutoffs.
Often a cardinal representation of the priority order, such as a merit score or a lottery number,
is used to identify these “cutoff” individuals. (See, for example, Appendix Figure A1.) This
observation motivates the following equilibrium notion.
For any category c ∈ C, a cutoff fc is an element of I ∪ {∅} such that fc pic ∅. Cutoffs
in our model play the role of prices for exchange or production economies, where the last
condition corresponds to prices being non-negative in those economies. We refer to a list of
cutoffs f = (fc)c∈C as a cutoff vector. Let F be the set of cutoff vectors.
Given a cutoff vector f ∈ F , for any patient i ∈ I, define the budget set of patient i at
cutoff vector f as
Bi(f) = {c ∈ C : i pic fc} .
A cutoff equilibrium is a pair consisting of a cutoff vector and a matching (f, µ) ∈ F ×M
such that
1. For every patient i ∈ I,
(a) µ(i) ∈ Bi(f) ∪ {∅}, and
(b) Bi(f) 6= ∅ =⇒ µ(i) ∈ Bi(f).
2. For every category c ∈ C,
|µ−1(c)| < rc =⇒ fc = ∅.
A cutoff equilibrium is an analogue of a competitive equilibrium for a reserve system. A cutoff
vector-matching pair is a cutoff equilibrium if
1. each patient who has a non-empty budget set is matched with a category in her budget
set, and each patient who has an empty budget set remains unmatched, and
2. each category which has not filled its quota under this matching has cutoff ∅.
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The first condition corresponds to “preference maximization within budget set” and the second
condition corresponds to the “market clearing condition.”
Our first characterization result gives an equivalence between cutoff equilibrium matchings
and matchings that satisfy our basic axioms.
Theorem 1. For any matching µ ∈ M that complies with eligibility requirements, is non-
wasteful, and respects priorities, there exists a cutoff vector f ∈ F that supports the pair (f, µ)
as a cutoff equilibrium. Conversely, for any cutoff equilibrium (f, µ) ∈ F ×M, matching µ
complies with eligibility requirements, is non-wasteful, and respects priorities.
There can be multiple equilibrium cutoff vectors that supports a matching at cutoff equilibria.
Next, we explore the structure of equilibrium cutoff vectors.
For any matching µ ∈M and category c ∈ C, define
f
µ
c =
{
minpic µ
−1(c) if |µ−1(c)| = rc
∅ otherwise and, (1)
fµ
c
=
{
minpic
{
i ∈ µ(I) : i pic maxpic
(
I \ µ(I)) ∪ {∅}} if maxpic (I \ µ(I)) ∪ {∅} 6= ∅
∅ otherwise
. (2)
Here,
• fµc identifies
– the lowest pic-priority patient who is matched with category c if all category-c units
are exhausted under µ, and
– ∅ if there are some idle category-c units under µ,
whereas
• fµ
c
identifies
– the lowest pic-priority patient with the property that every weakly higher pic-priority
patient than her is matched under µ if some category-c eligible patient is unmatched
under µ, and
– ∅ if all category-c eligible patients are matched under µ.
Let µ be any matching that respect priorities. By construction,
f
µ
c pic f
µ
c
for any c ∈ C.
Our next result characterizes the set of cutoff vectors.
Lemma 1. Let µ ∈M be a matching that complies with eligibility requirements, is non-wasteful,
and respects priorities. Then the pair (g, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium if, and only if,
f
µ
c pic gc pic f
µ
c
for any c ∈ C.
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An immediate corollary to Lemma 1 is that for each cutoff equilibrium matching µ, f
µ
=
(f
µ
c )c∈C is a maximum equilibrium cutoff vector and f
µ = (fµ
c
)c∈C is a minimum equi-
librium cutoff vector.
Of these equilibrium cutoff vectors, the first one has a clear economic interpretation. The
maximum equilibrium cutoff of a category indicates the selectivity of this particular category.
The higher the maximum cutoff is the more competitive it becomes to receive a unit through this
category. This is also the cutoff that is typically announced in real-life applications of reserve
systems due to its clear interpretation. The interpretation of the minimum equilibrium cutoff
of a category is more about the entire matching than the category itself, and in some sense it is
artificially lower than the maximum equilibrium cutoff due to individuals who are matched with
other categories. All other equilibrium cutoffs between the two are also artificial in a similar
sense. Therefore, for much of our analysis we focus on the maximum equilibrium cutoff vector.
3.2 Characterization via Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
Although Theorem 1 gives a full characterization of matchings that satisfy our three axioms, it
leaves the question of how to find such a matching open. In this section, we present a procedure
to construct all such matchings utilizing the celebrated deferred-acceptance algorithm by Gale
and Shapley (1962).
Consider the following hypothetical many-to-one matching market. The two sides of the
market are the set of patients I and the set of categories C. Each patient i ∈ I can be matched
with at most one category, whereas each category c ∈ C can be matched with as many as rc
patients. Category c is endowed with the linear order pic that is specified in the primitives of
the original rationing problem.
Observe that in our hypothetical market, all the primitives introduced so far naturally follows
from the primitives of the original problem. The only primitive of the hypothetical market that
is somewhat “artificial” is the next one:
Each patient i ∈ I has a strict preference relation i over the set C ∪{∅}, such that, for each
patient i ∈ I,
c i ∅ ⇐⇒ patient i is eligible for category c.
While in the original problem a patient is indifferent between all units (and therefore all cat-
egories as well), in the hypothetical market she has strict preferences between the categories.
This “flexibility” in the construction of the hypothetical market is the basis of our main char-
acterization.
For each patient i ∈ I, let Pi be the set of all preferences constructed in this way, and let
P = ×i∈IPi.
Given a preference profile = (i)i∈I , the individual-proposing deferred-acceptance algo-
rithm (DA) produces a matching as follows.
Individual Proposing Deferred Acceptance Algorithm (DA)
Step 1: Each patient in I applies to her most preferred category among categories
for which she is eligible. Suppose that I1c is the set of patients who apply to category
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c. Category c tentatively assigns applicants with the highest priority according to
pic until all patients in I
1
c are chosen or all rc units are allocated, whichever comes
first, and permanently rejects the rest. If there are no rejections, then stop.
Step k: Each patient who was rejected in Step k-1 applies to her next preferred
category among categories for which she is eligible, if such a category exists. Suppose
that Ikc is the union of the set of patients who were tentatively assigned to category
c in Step k-1 and the set of patients who just proposed to category c. Category c
tentatively assigns patients in Ikc with the highest priority according to pic until all
patients in Ikc are chosen or all rc units are allocated, whichever comes first, and
permanently rejects the rest. If there are no rejections, then stop.
The algorithm terminates when there are no rejections, at which point all tentative
assignments are finalized.
A matching µ ∈ M is called DA-induced if it is the outcome of DA for some preference
profile ∈ P.
We are ready to present our next result:
Theorem 2. A matching complies with eligibility requirements, is non-wasteful, and it respects
priorities if, and only if, it is DA-induced.
Not only is this result a second characterization of matchings that satisfy our three basic
axioms, it also provides a concrete procedure to calculate all such matchings. Equivalently,
Theorem 2 provides us with a procedure to derive all cutoff equilibria. This latter interpretation
of our characterization leads us to a refinement of cutoff equilibrium matchings explored in our
next section.
3.3 Sequential Reserve Matching
An interpretation of the DA-induced matchings is helpful to motivate in focusing a subset of these
matchings. Recall that the hypothetical two-sided matching market constructed above relies on
an artificial preference profile (i)i∈I of patients over categories. What this corresponds to
under the DA algorithm is that any patient i is considered for categories that deem her eligible
in sequence, following the ranking of these categories under her artificial preferences i. Unless
there is a systematic way to construct these preferences, it may be difficult to motivate adopting
this methodology for real-life applications. For example, if a patient i is considered first for
an unreserved category and then for an essential personnel category, whereas another patient
j with similar characteristics is considered for them in the reverse order, it may be difficult to
justify this practice. That is, while there is a potentially large set of matchings that satisfy
our three axioms, not all are necessarily obtained through an intuitive procedure. This may be
a challenge especially in the context of medical rationing, since procedural fairness is also an
important ethical consideration in this context. Procedural fairness is the main motivation for
our focus in a subset of these matchings.
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In many real-life applications of reserve systems, institutions process reserve categories se-
quentially and allocate units associated with each category one at a time using its category-
specific priority order. We next formulate matchings obtained in this way and relate them to
our characterization in Theorem 2.
An order of precedence . is a linear order over the set of categories C. For any two
categories c, c′ ∈ C,
c . c′
means that category-c units are to be allocated before category-c′ units. In this case, we say
category c has higher precedence than category c′. Let ∆ be the set of all orders of precedence.
For a given order of precedence . ∈ ∆, the induced sequential reserve matching ϕ., is a
matching that is constructed as follows:
Suppose categories are ordered under . as
c1 . c2 . . . . . c|C|.
Matching ϕ. is found sequentially in |C| steps:
Step 1: Following their priority order under pic1 , the highest priority rc1 category-c1-
eligible patients in I are matched with category c1. If there are less than rc1 eligible
patients in I than all of these eligible patients are matched with category c1. Let I
1
be the set of patients matched in Step 1.
Step k: Following their priority order under pick , the highest priority rck category-
ck-eligible patients in I \ ∪k−1k′=1Ik
′
are matched with category ck. If there are less
than rck eligible patients in I \∪k−1k′=1Ik
′
then all of these eligible patients are matched
with category ck. Let I
k be the set of patients matched in Step k.
Given an order of precedence . ∈ ∆, the induced sequential reserve matching complies with
eligibility requirements, is non-wasteful, and it respect priorities. Thus, it is DA-induced by
Theorem 2. Indeed it corresponds to a very specific DA-induced matching.
Proposition 1. Fix an order of precedence . ∈ ∆. Let the preference profile .∈ P be such
that, for each patient i ∈ I and pair of categories c, c′ ∈ C,
c .i c′ ⇐⇒ c . c′.
Then the sequential reserve matching ϕ. is DA-induced from the preference profile ..
We conclude this section with a comparative static result regarding the maximum equilibrium
cutoff vectors supporting sequential reserve matchings:
Proposition 2. Fix a preferential treatment category c ∈ C, another category c′ ∈ C \ {c}, and
a pair of orders of precedence ., .′ ∈ ∆ such that:
• c′ . c,
• c .′ c′, and
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• for any cˆ ∈ C and c∗ ∈ C \ {c, c′}
cˆ . c∗ ⇐⇒ cˆ .′ c∗.
That is, .′ is obtained from . by only changing the order of c with its immediate predecessor c′.
Then,
f
ϕ.′
c pic f
ϕ.
c .
Recall that the maximum equilibrium cutoff for a category is indicative of how selective the
category is. Therefore, the earlier a category is processed under a sequential reserve matching
the more selective it becomes by Proposition 2. This result is intuitive because the earlier a
category is processed, the larger is the set of patients who compete for these units in a setwise
inclusion sense.
4 Reserve Systems under a Baseline Priority Order
In many real-life applications of reserve systems, there is a baseline priority order pi of individuals.
Starting with Hafalir, Yenmez and Yildirim (2013), the earlier market design literature on
reserve systems exclusively considered this environment.11 This priority order may depend on
scores in a standardized exam, a random lottery, or arrival time of application. In our main
application of pandemic resource allocation, it may depend on SOFA scores described in Section
2.1. This baseline priority order is used to construct the priority order for each of the reserve
categories, although each category except one gives preferential treatment to a specific subset of
individuals. For example, in our main application these could be essential personnel or persons
from disadvantaged communities. In this section, we focus on this subclass of reserve systems
and present an analysis of reserve matching on this class.
To formulate this subclass, we designate a beneficiary group Ic ⊆ I for each category
c ∈ C. It is assumed that all patients in its beneficiary group are eligible for a category. That
is, for any c ∈ C and i ∈ Ic,
i pic ∅.
There is an all-inclusive category u ∈ C, called the unreserved category, which has all
patients as its set of beneficiaries and endowed with the baseline priority order. That is,
Iu = I and piu = pi.
Any other category c ∈ C \ {u}, referred to as a preferential treatment category, has a
more exclusive set Ic ⊂ I of beneficiaries and it is endowed with a priority order pic with the
following structure: for any pair of patients i, i′ ∈ I,
i ∈ Ic and i′ ∈ I \ Ic =⇒ i pic i′,
i, i′ ∈ Ic and i pi i′ =⇒ i pic i′, and
i, i′ ∈ I \ Ic and i pi i′ =⇒ i pic i′.
11Including Hafalir, Yenmez and Yildirim (2013), several prior studies consider the allocation of heterogeneous
objects and the baseline priority often depends on the object.
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Under pic, beneficiaries of category c are prioritized over patients who are not, but otherwise
their relative priority order is induced by the baseline priority order pi.
Let Ig, referred to as the set of general-community patients, be the set of patients who
are each a beneficiary of the unreserved category only:
Ig = I \ ∪c∈C\{u}Ic.
In particular two types of such problems have widespread applications.
We say that a priority profile (pic)c∈C has soft reserves if, for any category c ∈ C and any
patient i ∈ I,
i pic ∅.
Under a soft reserve system all individuals are eligible for all categories. This is the case, for
example, in our main application of pandemic resource allocation.
We say that a priority profile (pic)c∈C has hard reserves if, for any preferential treatment
category c ∈ C \ {u},
1. i pic ∅ for any of its beneficiaries i ∈ Ic, whereas
2. ∅ pic i for any patient i ∈ I \ Ic who is not a beneficiary.
Under a hard reserve system, only the beneficiaries of a preferred treatment category are eligible
for units in this category. This is the case, for example, in H1-B visa allocation in the US.
4.1 Comparative Statics
Allocation rules based on sequential reserve matching are used in a wide range of practical
applications. While an aspect that is often ignored in practical applications, it is important to
pay attention to the choice of the order of precedence in these problems, for it has potentially
significant distributional implications. In this subsection we focus on sequential reserve matching
under soft reserves, as that is the relevant case for our main application of pandemic rationing.
We already know from Proposition 2 that the later a category is processed, the less compet-
itive it becomes. A natural follow up question is whether this also means that the beneficiaries
of this category necessarily benefits from this comparative static exercise. The answer would be
of course straightforward, if each patient was a beneficiary of a single category. But this is not
the case in our model, because even if each patient is a beneficiary of at most one preferential
treatment category, they are also each a beneficiary of the unreserved category. Indeed, even if
that was not the case, unless the reserves are hard non-beneficiaries may still be matched with
units from preferential treatment categories. So the answer to this question is not an immediate
implication of Proposition 2. Under some assumptions such as when there is only one preferen-
tial treatment category (Dur et al., 2018), this question is already answered in the affirmative.
However, as we present in the next example, this is not always the case.
Example 1. Suppose there are q = 6 medical units to be allocated in total. There are six
categories: the unreserved category u and five preferential treatment categories c, c′, c∗, cˆ, c˜ and
each category has a single unit capacity.
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Suppose there are seven patients. All patients are beneficiaries of the unreserved category u:
Iu = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6, i7}.
The beneficiaries of preferential treatment categories c, c∗, and c˜ are given as
Ic = {i1, i3, i6}, Ic∗ = {i2, i5}, Ic˜ = {i4, i7},
while there are no beneficiaries of preferential treatment categories c′ and cˆ: Ic′ = ∅ and Icˆ = ∅.
There are also no general-community patients: Ig = ∅. Suppose pi, the baseline priority order of
patients, is given as
i1 pi i2 pi i3 pi i4 pi i5 pi i6 pi i7.
Also assume that all patients are eligible for all preferential treatment categories besides the
unreserved category u.
We consider two sequential reserve matchings based on the following two orders of precedence:
. : c′ . c . c∗ . cˆ . c˜ . u,
and
.′ : c .′ c′ .′ c∗ .′ cˆ .′ c˜ .′ u.
In the following table, we demonstrate the construction of the two induced sequential reserve
matchings by processing their mechanics in parallel:
Order of Precedence . Order of Precedence .′
Step Category Patient Category Patient
1 c′ i1 c i1
2 c i3 c
′ i2
3 c∗ i2 c∗ i5
4 cˆ i4 cˆ i3
5 c˜ i7 c˜ i4
6 u i5 u i6
Thus the two sequential reserve matchings match the patients
ϕ. = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i7} and ϕ.′ = {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, i6}.
In this problem category-c′ and cˆ units are treated as if they are of unreserved category u, as
these two categories do not have any beneficiaries in the problem. We use the baseline priority
order pi to match them.
Under the first order of precedence ., the highest pi-priority patient i1, who is also a category-
c beneficiary, receives the first unit, which is reserved for category c′. As a result, i3, who is the
next category-c beneficiary, receives the only category-c unit. In the end, units associated with
categories c∗ and c˜ are matched with their highest and lowest priority beneficiaries i2 and i7,
respectively. The highest priority beneficiary of c˜, patient i4, receives the category-cˆ unit, which
is processed like the unreserved category and before c˜. Hence, the lowest priority beneficiary of
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category c, i6 remains unmatched as the last unit, which is reserved for the unreserved category,
goes to i5. Thus,
ϕ.(Ic) = {i1, i3}
is the set of matched category-c beneficiaries.
Under the second order of precedence .′ that switches the order of c and c′, the selectivity of
category c increases as it is processed earlier: the highest priority category-c patient i1 receives
its unit instead of i3. This leads to the units associated with categories c
∗ and c˜ being matched
with their lowest and highest priority beneficiaries i5 and i4, respectively – this is a switch of
roles for these categories with respect to .. This is because the highest-priority beneficiary of c∗,
patient i2, is now matched with category c
′, which is processed like the unreserved category before
c∗. This enables the lowest priority beneficiary of category c, patient i6, to be matched with the
unreserved category as she is prioritized higher than i7 under the baseline priority order. Hence,
ϕ.′(Ic) = {i1, i3, i6}
is the set of matched category-c beneficiaries.
Thus,
ϕ.(Ic) ( ϕ.′(Ic)
although category c is processed earlier under .′ than under ..
Observe that our negative example holds even though each patient is a beneficiary of at
most one preferential treatment category. Nevertheless, a positive result holds for our main
application of soft reserves provided that there are at most five categories and each patient is a
beneficiary of at most one preferential treatment category.
Proposition 3. Assuming
1. there are at most five categories, and
2. each patient is a beneficiary of at most one preferential treatment category,
consider a soft reserve system induced by a baseline priority order. Fix a preferential treatment
category c ∈ C \ {u}, another category c′ ∈ C \ {c}, and a pair of orders of precedence ., .′ ∈ ∆
such that:
• c′ . c,
• c .′ c′, and
• for any cˆ ∈ C and c∗ ∈ C \ {c, c′},
cˆ . c∗ ⇐⇒ cˆ .′ c∗.
That is, .′ is obtained from . by only changing the order of c with its immediate predecessor c′.
Then,
ϕ.′(Ic) ⊆ ϕ.(Ic).
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4.2 Smart Reserve Matching
Although virtually all practical applications of reserve systems are implemented through sequen-
tial reserve matching, this class of mechanisms may suffer from one important shortcoming: they
may lead to Pareto inefficient outcomes, due to myopic processing of reserves. The following
example illustrates both how this may happen, and also motivates a possible refinement based
on smart processing of reserves.
Example 2. Consider a hard reserve system induced by baseline priority order pi. There are
two patients I = {i1, i2} who are priority ordered as
i1 pi i2
under the baseline priority order pi. There are two categories; an unreserved category u with
an all-inclusive beneficiary set of I = {i1, i2}, and a preferential treatment category c with
a beneficiary set Ic = {i1} of a single preferential treatment patient. Both categories have a
capacity of one unit each (i.e., rc = ru = 1). Since the reserves are hard, the resulting category-
specific priority orders are given as follows:
i1 piu i2 piu ∅ and i1 pic ∅ pic i2.
Consider the sequential reserve matching ϕ. induced by the order of precedence ., where
u . c.
Under matching ϕ., first patient i1 is matched with the unreserved category u and subsequently
the category-c unit is left idle since no remaining patient is eligible for this preferential treatment
category. Therefore,
ϕ. =
(
i1 i2
u ∅
)
,
resulting in the set of matched patients ϕ.(I) = {i1}.
Next consider the sequential reserve matching ϕ.′ induced by the order of precedence .
′, where
c .′ u.
Under matching ϕ.′, first patient i1 is matched with the preferential treatment category c and
subsequently patient i2 is matched with the unreserved category u. Therefore,
ϕ.′ =
(
i1 i2
c u
)
,
resulting in the set of matched patients ϕ.′(I) = {i1, i2}. Since ϕ.(I) ( ϕ.′(I), matching ϕ. is
Pareto dominated by matching ϕ.′.
Observe that Example 2 also illustrates that the cause of Pareto inefficiency is the myopic
allocation of categories under sequential reserve matchings. Under matching ϕ., the more flexible
unreserved unit is allocated to patient i1 who is the only beneficiary of category-c. This results
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in a suboptimal utilizations of reserves, which can be avoided with the concept of “smart reserve
matching” we introduce below.
To this end, we first introduce a new axiom, which together with non-wastefulness imply
Pareto efficiency.
Definition 4. A matching µ ∈M is maximal in beneficiary assignment if
µ ∈ arg max
ν∈M
∣∣ ∪c∈C\{u} (ν−1(c) ∩ Ic)∣∣.
This axiom simply requires that the reserves should be maximally assigned to target bene-
ficiaries to the extent it is feasible. It precludes the myopic assignment of categories to patients
since the desirability of a matching depends on the structure of the matching as a whole rather
than the individual assignments it prescribes for each category.
It is worth noting that the inefficiency observed in Example 2 is specific to the case of hard
reserves and cannot happen for soft reserves, as in our main application of pandemic rationing.
Nonetheless, maximality in beneficiary assignment is a desirable axiom for soft reserves because
sub-optimal utilization of reserves may receive heightened scrutiny. For example, consider a
scenario with two preferential treatment categories, essential personnel and disadvantaged, each
with one reserve. Suppose patient A is both essential personnel and disadvantaged, patient
B is disadvantaged, and there are several other patients who are neither. One possible way
to use these reserves is to assign patient A to the disadvantaged reserve, leaving no other
preferential treatment patients available for the essential personnel reserve. In this case, the
essential personnel reserve would be opened up to patients who are neither essential personnel
nor disadvantaged. This could in turn mean only one of the reserves is assigned to members of the
target beneficiary groups. This outcome could be seen problematic since an alternative, which
assigns patient A to the essential personnel reserve (instead of the disadvantaged reserve) and
patient B to the disadvantaged reserve, accommodates both reserves. By imposing maximality
in beneficiary assignment, we avoid this shortcoming through a “smart” utilization of reserves.
Building on this insight, we next present an algorithm that generates smart cutoff matchings:
Smart Reserve Matching Algorithm
Fix a parameter n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ru} that represents the number of unreserved units to
be processed in the beginning of the algorithm.12 The remaining unreserved units
are to be processed at the end of the algorithm.
Fix a baseline priority order pi, and for the ease of description relabel patients so
that
i1 pi i2 pi . . . pi i|I|.
Proceed in two steps.
Step 1: Iteratively construct two sequences of patient sets Ju0 ⊆ Ju1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ Ju|I|,
which determine patients to be matched with the unreserved category u in this
step, and J0 ⊆ J1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ J|I|, which determine the patients to be matched with
12For n = 0, this algorithm is equivalent to the horizontal envelope algorithm in So¨nmez and Yenmez (2020).
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preferential treatment categories in C \ {u} that they are beneficiaries of, and a
sequence of sets of matchings M0 ⊇M1 ⊇ . . . ⊇M|I| in |I| substeps.
Define Step 1.(k) for any k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , |I|} as follows:
If k = 1, let
Ju0 = ∅, J0 = ∅,
andM0 be the set of all matchings that are maximal in beneficiary assignment; that
is
M0 = arg max
ν∈M
∣∣ ∪c∈C\{u} (ν−1(c) ∩ Ic)∣∣.
If k > 1, then sets of patients Juk−1 and Jk−1 and set of matchings Mk−1 are con-
structed in the previous substep, Step 1.(k − 1).
Step 1.(k): Process patient ik. Three cases are possible:
• If |Juk−1| < n and there exists a matching in Mk−1 that matches
patient ik with the unreserved category u, then define
Juk = J
u
k−1∪{ik}, Jk = Jk−1, and Mk =
{
µ ∈Mk−1 : µ(ik) = u
}
.
• Otherwise, if there exists a matching in Mk−1 that matches patient
ik with a preferential treatment category c ∈ C \ {u} that she is a
beneficiary of, that is ik ∈ Ic, then define
Juk = J
u
k−1, Jk = Jk−1 ∪ {ik}, and
Mk =
{
µ ∈Mk−1 : µ(ik) 6∈ {∅, u} and ik ∈ Iµ(ik)
}
.
• Otherwise, define
Juk = J
u
k−1, Jk = Jk−1, and Mk =Mk−1.
Step 2: For any matching µ ∈M|I|, construct a matching σ ∈M as follows:
• Assign µ(i) to every patient i ∈ J|I| ∪ Ju|I|.
• One at a time iteratively assign the remaining units to the remaining highest
priority patient in I \ (Ju|I| ∪J|I|) who is eligible for the category of the assigned
unit in the following order:
1. the remaining units of the preferential treatment categories in an arbitrary
order, and
2. the remaining units of the unreserved category u.
Every matching σ constructed in this manner is referred to as a smart reserve matching
induced by assigning n unreserved units subsequently at the beginning of the algorithm. Let
MnS be the set of all reserve matchings for a given n.
We have the following result about the sets of patients matched under smart reserve match-
ings:
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Lemma 2. Consider either a soft reserve system or a hard reserve system induced by a baseline
priority order pi. For any n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ru} and any two smart reserve matchings σ, ν ∈MnS,
σ−1(u) = ν−1(u), and ∪c∈C\{u} (σ−1(c) ∩ Ic) = ∪c∈C\{u}(ν−1(c) ∩ Ic),
and moreover,
σ(I) = ν(I).
Lemma 2 states that every smart reserve matching for a given n matches the same set of
patients with the unreserved category u, the same set of patients with preferential treatment
categories in C \ {u} that they are beneficiaries of, and the same set of patients overall.
In a soft reserve system or a hard reserve system, for a given n, we denote the set patients
matched in every smart reserve matching with n unreserved units processed first as InS .
13 By
Lemma 2, for any σ ∈MnS ,
InS = σ(I).
Our second result on smart reserve matchings is as follows:
Proposition 4. Consider either a soft reserve system or a hard reserve system induced by a
baseline priority order pi. For any n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ru}, any smart reserve matching inMnS complies
with eligibility requirements, is non-wasteful, respects priorities, and is maximal in beneficiary
assignment.
The choice of parameter n is not without a consequence. In particular, matchings produced
by the algorithm with the lowest parameter n = 0 and the highest parameter n = ru both have
distinctive distributional consequences.
Theorem 3. Consider either a soft reserve system or a hard reserve system induced by a baseline
priority order pi. Let σru ∈ MruS be a smart reserve matching when all unreserved units are
assigned first (i.e., n = ru) and σ0 ∈ M0S be a smart reserve matching when all unreserved
units are assigned last (i.e., n = 0). Then, for any cutoff equilibrium matching µ ∈ M that is
maximal in beneficiary assignment,
f
σru
u pi f
µ
u pi f
σ0
u .
Theorem 3 states that among all maximum equilibrium cutoff vectors that support maximal
matchings in beneficiary assignment, the selectivity of the unreserved category is
• the most competitive for smart reserve matchings with n = ru, that is, when all unreserved
category units are assigned in the beginning of the algorithm, and
• the least competitive for smart reserve matchings with n = 0, that is, when all unreserved
category units are assigned at the end of the algorithm.
13We describe a polynomial-time algorithm to construct InS and a smart reserve matching in Appendix A.4.
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Theorem 3 is silent about the qualifications of maximum equilibrium cutoffs of preferen-
tial treatment categories supporting smart reserve matchings. While keeping the maximality
in beneficiary assignment, the patients who are matched with preferential treatment categories
are uniquely determined under the two extreme smart reserve matchings (and for any given n),
respectively. However, there can be multiple ways of assigning these patients to different pref-
erential treatment categories. Thus, the maximum equilibrium cutoffs of preferential treatment
categories are not uniquely determined for these matchings.
4.3 Related Theoretical Literature
Our study of reserve systems contributes to literature in matching market design focused on
distributional issues. Our main results of Theorems 1-3 as well as Propositions 1 and 2 have no
antecedents in the literature, and they are novel to this paper. In contrast, Propositions 3 and
4 extend previously known ideas to our model.
While Theorem 1 is novel and our paper is the first one to formally introduce the notion
of cutoff equilibrium for reserve systems, due to its intuitive appeal the use of this notion is
widespread in real-life applications of reserve systems. In particular, the outcomes of reserve
systems are often announced together with the cutoffs that support them. Examples include
admission to exam high schools in Chicago (Dur, Pathak and So¨nmez, 2020), assignment of gov-
ernment positions in India (So¨nmez and Yenmez, 2019a,b), college admissions in Brazil (Aygu¨n
and Bo, 2020), and H1-B visa allocation in the US for years 2006-2008 (Pathak, Rees-Jones and
So¨nmez, 2020). For the first three of these applications the cutoffs are given in terms of exam
or merit scores, whereas for the last application the cutoffs are given in terms of the date of
visa application receipt. While the concept of cutoff equilibrium for reserve systems is novel to
our paper, cutoffs are used in simpler matching environments in the absence of distributional
considerations (see, e.g., Balinski and So¨nmez (1999), Azevedo and Leshno (2016), and Leshno
and Lo (2020)).
In addition to presenting a characterization of outcomes that satisfy three basic axioms,
Theorem 2 also provides a procedure to calculate all cutoff matchings. While our characterization
itself is novel, the use of the deferred acceptance algorithm to derive a specific cutoff matching
is not. This technique to obtain cutoff levels for reserve systems has been employed in various
real-life applications, including in school choice algorithms of Boston Public Schools (Dur et al.,
2018) and Chile (Correa et al., 2019), and college admissions algorithm for Engineering Colleges
in India (Baswana et al., 2019).
Our characterizations in Theorems 1 and 2 use three simple axioms. As such, the resulting
matchings can fail to be Pareto efficient in some applications. This failure has to do with rather
mechanical and inflexible assignment of agents to categories as presented by Example 2. This
can be mitigated by filling reserves in a “smart” way. In Section 4.2 we introduce a class of
smart reserve matching algorithms which does precisely this and through maximal utilization of
reserves always generates a Pareto efficient matching. The smart reserve matching algorithm is
a generalization of the horizontal envelope algorithm introduced by So¨nmez and Yenmez (2020).
under exclusively “minimum guarantee” type reserves. Moreover, for n = 0 the smart reserve
matching algorithm becomes equivalent to the horizontal envelope algorithm.
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Of the two analytical results that extend previously known ideas in the literature, Proposition
3 extends the comparative static results of Dur et al. (2018); Dur, Pathak and So¨nmez (2020);
Pathak, Rees-Jones and So¨nmez (2020). What is perhaps more novel is Example 1, which shows
that the comparative static exercise in Proposition 3 fails to hold once there are more than five
categories. Another implication of this situation is that the proof of Proposition 3 is considerably
more involved than its predecessors. Proposition 4, on the other hand, extends the analysis on
horizontal envelope algorithm in So¨nmez and Yenmez (2020) to the more general smart reserve
matching algorithm.
In addition to above described papers which directly relate to our analysis, there are also
several others that have examined allocation in the presence of various distributional constraints
such as minimum-guarantee reserves (or lower quotas), upper quotas, and regional quotas. Some
of the most related ones include Abdulkadirog˘lu (2005), Biro et al. (2010), Kojima (2012),
Budish et al. (2013), Hafalir, Yenmez and Yildirim (2013), Westkamp (2013), Ehlers et al.
(2014), Echenique and Yenmez (2015), Kamada and Kojima (2015), Kamada and Kojima (2017)
Kamada and Kojima (2018), Aygu¨n and Turhan (2020), Bo (2016), Dogan (2016), Kominers
and So¨nmez (2016), and Fragiadakis and Troyan (2017).
Our paper also introduces the medical rationing into the market design literature. By con-
sidering a real-world resource allocation problem, we contribute to the study of formal properties
of specific allocation processes in the field and the study of alternative mechanisms. Studies in
this vein include those on entry-level labor markets (Roth, 1984; Roth and Peranson, 1999),
school choice (Balinski and So¨nmez, 1999; Abdulkadirog˘lu and So¨nmez, 2003), spectrum auc-
tions (Milgrom, 2000), kidney exchange (Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2004), internet auctions
(Edelman, Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2007; Varian, 2007), course allocation (So¨nmez and U¨nver,
2010; Budish, 2011), cadet-branch matching (So¨nmez and Switzer, 2013; So¨nmez, 2013), assign-
ment of airport arrival slots (Schummer and Vohra, 2013; Schummer and Abizada, 2017), and
refugee resettlement (Jones and Teytelboym, 2017; Delacre´taz, Kominers and Teytelboym, 2019;
Andersson, 2019).
5 Additional Design Considerations for Pandemic Rationing
5.1 Dynamics of Allocation
In Sections 3 and 4, we model pandemic rationing as a one-shot static reserve system. Several
vital resources, however, must be rationed during a pandemic as patients in need present. Hence,
it is important to formulate how our static model can be operationalized in an application where
patient arrival and allocation are both dynamic. The adequate formulation depends on the
specific characteristics of the rationed resource. Most notably, answers to the following two
questions factor in the implementation details:
1. Is the resource fully consumed upon allocation or is it durable, utilized over a period, and
can it be re-allocated?
2. Is there immediate urgency for allocation?
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Since most guidelines are on rationing of vaccines, ventilators, ICU beds, and anti-viral drugs
or treatments, we focus our discussion on these four cases.
5.1.1 Vaccine Allocation
A unit of a vaccine is consumed upon allocation and reallocation of the unit is not possible.
Moreover, there is no immediate urgency to allocate a vaccine. Hence, a large number of units
can be allocated simultaneously. Therefore, vaccine allocation is an application of our model
where our proposed reserve system can be implemented on a static basis as vaccines become
available.
This is, however, not the only reasonable way a reserve system can be operationalized for
vaccine allocation. In the United States, there is a tradition of distributing influenza vaccines
at local pharmacies or healthcare providers on a first-come-first-serve basis. This practice can
be interpreted as a single-category special case of a reserve system where the priorities are
based on the time of arrival. This practice can easily be extended to any sequential reserve
matching system with multiple categories where the baseline priorities are determined by the
time of arrival. Under this dynamic implementation of a reserve system, as a patient arrives
to a healthcare provider she is allocated a vaccine as long as there is availability in a category
for which she is a beneficiary. If there are multiple such categories, the patient is assigned a
unit from the category that has the highest precedence under the sequential reserve matching.
While many have criticized first-come-first-serve allocation because of biases it induces based
on access to health care (e.g., Kinlaw and Levine (2007)), reserve categories can be designed to
mitigate these biases, even if priority is first-come-first-serve within each category. For example,
there can be a reserve category for patients from rural areas. There is an important precedent
for using a reserve system in this dynamic form. Between 2005-2008, H-1B immigration visas
in the US were allocated through a reserve system with general and advanced-degree reserve
categories where priority for each category was based on the application arrival time (Pathak,
Rees-Jones and So¨nmez, 2020).
5.1.2 Ventilator/ICU Bed Allocation
Since the relevant characteristics of ventilators and ICU beds are identical in relation to our
model, the implementation of reserve systems for these resources will be similar. Therefore, we
present the details of their implementation together. For simplicity in this subsection, we refer
the resource in short supply as a ventilator.
A ventilator is durable and can be reassigned once its use by its former occupant is com-
pleted. Moreover, there is always urgency in allocation of this vital resource. These two features
make direct static implementation of a reserve system impractical; implementation always has
to be dynamic. One important observation on ventilator allocation is key to formulate the im-
plementation: since a ventilator is durable and assigned to a patient for a period, it can be
interpreted as a good which is allocated at each instant. During the course of using a ventilator,
a patient’s clinical situation and her priority for one or more categories may change. Therefore,
with the arrival of each new patient, the allocation of all units has to be reevaluated. As such,
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the following additional ethical and legal consideration has an important bearing on the design
of a reserve system:
3. Can a patient be removed from a ventilator once she is assigned?
There is widespread debate on this issue in the United States. Piscitello et al. (2020) describes
25 states with protocols that discuss the ethical basis of re-assigning ventilators. As of June
2020, the majority of guidelines support ventilator withdrawal. If a ventilator can be withdrawn,
the design is simpler (and effectively identical to static implementation with each new arrival).
While patient data needs to be updated through the duration of ventilator use, no fundamental
adjustment is needed for the design of the main parameters of the reserve system. Of course in
this scenario, it is possible that the category of the unit occupied by the patient may change
over time. For example, a patient may initially be assigned a unit from the general category
even though she has sufficiently high priority for multiple categories such as the general category
and essential personnel category. At a later time, she may only have high enough priority for
the latter category. In this case, the patient will continue using the ventilator although for
accounting purposes she will start consuming a unit from a different category.
If a ventilator cannot be withdrawn, a reserve system can still be applied with a grandfa-
thering structure to reflect the property rights of patients who are already assigned. In this
case, the priority system has to give highest priority to occupants of the units from any category
for as long as they can hold these units despite a change in their clinical situation or arrival of
patients who otherwise would have higher priority for these units.
5.1.3 Anti-viral Drugs or Treatments
For anti-virals drugs and treatments, the vital resource is consumed upon allocation (as in
vaccine allocation) but there is typically urgency and allocation decisions will need to be made
as patients arrive (as in ventilator allocation). One possible dynamic implementation is based
on first-come-first-serve arrival within reserve categories. This would be akin to the dynamic
allocation scenario for ventilators with a baseline priority structure that depends on patient
arrival time as described in Section 5.1.1. Alternatively, drug assignment can be batched within
pre-specified time-windows. Drugs can then be assigned based on expectations of the number
of patients in each category over this time window. Since drugs would be administered by a
clinician, the relationship between a reserve system and cutoffs can be particularly valuable. A
clinician can simply assign the treatment to a patient if she clears the cutoff for any reserve
for which she is eligible. In fact, after the first version of our paper was circulated, some of
the authors assisted with the design of the system used at the University of Pittsburgh Medical
Center to allocate the anti-viral drug remdesivir in May 2020 with this implementation. The
system had special provisions for hardest hit and essential personnel and used lotteries for
prioritization (see White et al. (2020) for more details on this system.)
5.2 Procedural Dimensions of a Reserve System
A common theme of several medical rationing guidelines is the importance of the following
procedural dimensions: transparency and community engagement; accountability and responsi-
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bility; and adaptability and flexibility (WHO, 2007; Prehn and Vawter, 2008). We next briefly
describe some virtues of a reserve system along these dimensions.
Task forces which may include medical personnel, ethicists, and lawyers often decide on
prioritization. There is a widespread consensus about the need to accommodate these different
perspectives. For example, a John Hopkins study on community perceptions of medical rationing
states (Biddison et al., 2013):
Both groups felt strongly that no single principle could adequately balance the competing
aims and values triggered by allocation decisions. Some felt that a combination of
principles should be used.
We think that a clear link between a reserve category and a particular ethical principle may
help with community engagement and facilitate compromises between different stakeholders.
For example, suppose that a task force values reciprocity and instrumental value, but several
other goals as well. Then they could establish a reserve category for essential personnel for a
fraction of resources and use other reserve categories to balance these other goals.
The transparency associated with reserve categories may be one reason systems are often used
in settings that involve community engagement. For example, following debates between the pro-
neighborhood and pro-choice factions, Boston’s school assignment system established a reserve
where half of each school’s seats prioritize applicants from the walk zone in 1999. Likewise,
reserves were developed as part of India’s affirmative action system after more than a decade of
community involvement summarized in the 1979 Mandal Commission Report and formulated in
the landmark 1992 Indra Sahwney Supreme Court case. Similarly, after widespread community
outreach, OPTN introduced a reserve category for kidney allocation in 2014. This category
gives preferential treatment to patients with the highest expected benefit for 20% of the highest
quality deceased-donor kidneys. These reserve-system precedents suggest that stakeholders find
reserve categories easy to interpret.
The salience of reserve categories also helps with accountability and fostering public trust.
In a priority point system, by contrast, it may be more difficult to explain exactly how an
allocation rule reflects a particular value when points are aggregated across several dimensions.
Moreover, our result relating reserve systems to cutoff equilibrium also simplify the process of
explanation in situations where a patient is denied a resource. For example, if a patient is denied
an anti-viral, a clinician can show that the patient’s score was below the cutoffs for any category
in which the patient is eligible.
Reserve systems also allow for adaptability and flexibility because of the way the alloca-
tion problem is divided into smaller pieces. Within each piece, a prioritization decision can
be adjusted without the need to alter the categories. Emanuel et al. (2020) emphasizes that
“prioritization guidelines should differ by intervention and should respond to changing scientific
evidence.” In particular, vaccines and anti-viral drugs may rely on different ethical principles
than ventilators and ICU beds. We see this dimension of flexibility as particularly valuable given
the need for guidelines to evolve during different stages of a public health emergency. Moreover,
for certain resources, criteria may evolve as clinical information becomes available. For example,
when there is no information on clinical effectiveness of an anti-viral, it will be difficult chose a
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priority to maximize expected health outcomes because those are unknown; this may motivate
a lottery within the category. As clinical data emerge, however, these priorities can change,
without requiring a change in the category.14
5.3 Potential Reserve Categories in Current Debates
We next briefly describe some possible reserve categories and their relationship to some current
debates.
5.3.1 Essential Personnel Category
As we discussed in Section 2.2.1, there is widespread agreement on the desirability of prioritizing
essential personnel. Yet, Michigan is the only state to provide clear priority for essential person-
nel. Several states struggled to find a way to prioritize essential personnel, which led some to
completely abandon it, others to be vague, and still others to use essential personnel status only
as a tie-breaker. Adoption of a reserve system that includes a category giving preferential treat-
ment to essential personnel provides a tool to accommodate the underlying ethical principles of
reciprocity and instrumental value.
5.3.2 Disadvantaged Reserve Category
Public health emergencies can have differential impact across communities, and there are calls
for rationing guidelines to respond to differential incidence. For example, growing evidence
suggests that COVID-19 is hitting communities of color harder than other groups (see, e.g.,
Price-Haywood et al. (2020) and Sequist (2020)). These concerns have motivated criticisms of
existing rationing guidelines. Indeed, shortly after Massachusetts released their revised crisis
standards of care in April 2020, Manchanda, Couillard and Sivashanker (2020) criticize them
for exacerbating biases in expected health outcomes driven by discrimination in access to health
care or other social inequalities. For vaccines, Schmidt (2020) argues that rationing guidelines
should give priority to groups that have been structurally and historically disadvantaged.15 In
fact, Melinda Gates, a major benefactor of the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization,
emphasized that after health care workers, there should be tiered vaccine allocation to “black
people next, quite honestly, and many other people of color” (Ducharme, 2020). A reserve
system offers flexibility to accommodate these concerns. A portion of scarce resources could
be set aside in the form of a disadvantaged category based on legally-permissible measures of
disadvantage.
14With either lottery or non-lottery based prioritization, it is also possible to use a reserve system to measure
the effectiveness of the rationed medical resource (see Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2017) and Abdulkadiroglu et al.
(2019)).
15In fact, following circulation of the first draft of this paper, Schmidt (2020) advocated for a reserve system
for vaccines.
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5.3.3 Disabled Reserve Categories
Disabilities rights advocates have opposed rationing plans based on expected health outcomes
using survival probabilities because such criteria are inherently discriminatory. Ne’eman (2020)
argues that provisions that exclude certain groups can undermine overall trust in the medical
system “based on a well-founded fear of being sacrificed for the greater good.”16 Persad (2020)
recounts that several prefer either random selection or minimal triage that completely ignores
any differences in likelihood or magnitude of benefit, or the likely quantity of resources required
for benefit. A reserve system allows for a resolution of this dispute. In particular, a disabled
category can be established for disabled patients reserving some of the units for these groups. If
the representatives of these groups reach a decision to implement random lottery within disabled
patients for these units, this can be implemented under a reserve system without interfering with
the priority order for units in other categories.
5.3.4 Good Samaritan Reciprocity Category
Another possible category is a Good Samaritan reciprocity category, which reserves a fraction of
resources for those who have verified Good Samaritan acts. In such a category, a small fraction
of resources are reserved for those who have saved lives through their past Good Samaritan acts.
These could be participants for clinical trials on vaccine or treatment development (Emanuel
et al., 2020), altruistic donors who have donated their kidneys to a stranger, or people who
have donated large quantities of blood over the years. Good Samaritan status can also be
provided for compatible patient-donor pairs who voluntarily participate in kidney exchange
even though they do not have to, and save another patient’s life who was incompatible with
his/her donor. This type of incentive could save a large number of lives. So¨nmez, U¨nver and
Yenmez (2020) estimate 180 additional kidney patients could receive living donor transplants for
every 10 percent of compatible pairs who can be incentivized to participate in kidney exchange.
Community engagement exercises can determine which acts “deserve” a Good Samaritan status.
In addition to the ethical value of reciprocity, this category can also be motivated from incentives.
The mere existence of a modest reserve of this nature may mitigate more persistent and ongoing
crises in other healthcare domains through these incentives.
5.3.5 Expanding Supply through a Reserve System
While our analysis pertains to the rationing problem of a single entity, like a hospital system, it
can be extended to multiple entities. This extension would allow for considerations that can also
reduce waste in the system. For example, hospitals in the system can “loan” their unused units
to the system, say to a virtual hospital that consists of excess units loaned to the system, and
they can earn credit from the system for future use of the units at the virtual hospital when they
have a shortage. Hospitals can be incentivized to loan their unused units to the virtual hospital,
16The Disability Rights Education and Defense Fund argues that the probability of survival should not be
considered as long as it is positive (DREDF, 2020). That is, they claim that the “use of a disability to deny
or limit an individual’s access to health care or to provide them a lower priority in accessing scarce resources or
supplies constitutes a clear violation of disability nondiscrimination law.”
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if their patients receive some priority for some of the units in the virtual hospital. There can
be a specific reserve category where priorities may depend on credits earned by the hospitals,
while for another category priorities may be determined by clinical criteria only.
6 Conclusion
Because of the anticipated and ongoing shortage of key medical resources during public health
emergencies, several leaders in the medical ethics community have made important recommenda-
tions regarding medical rationing. These recommendations reflect compromises between several
ethical principles – maximizing lives, maximizing life-years, life-cycle considerations, instrumen-
tal values, reciprocity, protecting to the sickest, and non-exclusion. We have argued that a
reserve system offers additional flexibility to balance competing objectives.
The theory of reserve systems we develop is based on three simple criteria. Our formal
results relate these abstract principles to a cutoff equilibrium concept, and we provide a complete
characterization of all cutoff equilibria through a hypothetical two-sided matching market. We
then focus on an intuitive class of reserve matchings and analyze comparative static properties
within this class. Finally, we develop several formal results for scenarios where there is a baseline
priority order.
Aside from our main motivation of pandemic rationing, our results can be directly applied to
several other resource allocation problems with reserves. These include immigration visa alloca-
tion in the United States (Pathak, Rees-Jones and So¨nmez, 2020), affirmative action in school
choice systems in Boston, Chicago, New York City and Chile (Dur et al., 2018; Dur, Pathak and
So¨nmez, 2020; Correa et al., 2019), affirmative action for public school and government positions
in India (Aygu¨n and Turhan, 2017; Baswana et al., 2019; So¨nmez and Yenmez, 2019a,b), and
diversity plans for college admissions in Brazil (Aygu¨n and Bo, 2020). We leave explorations of
these connections to future research.
We hope that the reserve system we have analyzed will rarely be deployed. However, even
if rationing guidelines are rarely applied, their mere existence reflects a statement of values.
Several aspects of the design, including those related to essential personnel, disadvantaged and
disabled communities, adults and children run the risk of upsetting social harmony. For example,
Fink (2020) describes a risk with poorly designed systems excluding certain principles: “at the
end you have got a society at war with itself. Some people are going to be told they don’t matter
enough.” We have shown that a reserve system provides policy makers with an additional tool
to navigate these complex challenges. Although confronting scarcity in life-and-death situations
is dire, we also hope some of our ideas, such as creating a Good Samaritan category, hold the
potential to make progress on longstanding medical problems beyond immediate public health
emergencies.
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Appendix A Proofs (Online Appendix)
A.1 Proofs of Results in Section 3
Proof of Theorem 1.
Part 1. Suppose matching µ ∈ M complies with eligibility requirements, is non-wasteful, and
respects priorities. We construct a cutoff vector f ∈ F as follows: For each category c ∈ C,
define
fc =
{
minpic µ
−1(c) if |µ−1(c)| = rc,
∅ otherwise.
Fix a category c ∈ C. If |µ−1(c)| = rc then fc ∈ µ−1(c) by construction. Since µ complies
with eligibility requirements, then fc pic ∅. On the other hand, if |µ−1(c)| < rc, then fc = ∅.
Therefore, in either case fc pic ∅. We showed that f ∈ F , i.e., it is a well-defined cutoff vector.
Next, we show that (f, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium. Condition 2 in cutoff equilibrium definition
is immediately satisfied because if for any c ∈ C, |µ−1(c)| < rc, then fc = ∅ by construction.
We next show that Condition 1 in cutoff equilibrium definition is also satisfied in two parts.
Let i ∈ I.
(a) We show that µ(i) ∈ Bi(f)∪{∅}. If µ(i) = ∅ then we are done. Therefore, suppose µ(i) = c
for some c ∈ C. Two cases are possible:
– If |µ−1(c)| = rc, then fc = minpic µ−1(c), and hence i pic fc. Thus, c ∈ Bi(f).
– If |µ−1(c)| < rc, then fc = ∅ by construction. Since µ complies with eligibility
requirements, i pic fc = ∅. Thus, µ(i) ∈ Bi(f).
(b) We show that Bi(f) 6= ∅ =⇒ µ(i) ∈ Bi(f). Suppose Bi(f) 6= ∅; but to the contrary
of the claim, suppose that µ(i) 6∈ Bi(f). By Condition 1(a) in the definition of a cutoff
equilibrium, µ(i) = ∅. Let c ∈ Bi(f). Since µ respects priorities, then for every j ∈ µ−1(c)
we have j pic i. If |µ−1(c)| = rc, then by construction, fc ∈ µ−1(c), and hence, fc pic i,
contradicting c ∈ Bi(f). We conclude that |µ−1(c)| < rc. Then by construction, fc = ∅.
Since c ∈ Bi(f), i pic fc = ∅. These two statements together with µ(i) = ∅ contradict
non-wastefulness of µ. Thus, µ(i) ∈ Bi(f).
Hence, we showed that (f, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium.
Part 2. Conversely, suppose pair (f, µ) ∈ F ×M is a cutoff equilibrium. We will show that
matching µ complies with eligibility requirements, is non-wastefulness, and respects priorities.
Compliance with eligibility requirements: Consider a patient i ∈ I. Since by Condition 1(a) of
cutoff equilibrium definition µ(i) 6= ∅ implies µ(i) ∈ Bi(f), we have i pic fc. Since the cutoff
satisfies fc pic ∅, by transitivity of pic, i pic ∅. Therefore, µ complies with eligibility requirements.
Non-wastefulness: Let i ∈ I be such that µ(i) = ∅ and i pic ∅ for some c ∈ C. We show that
|µ−1(c)| = rc. Then by Condition 1(a) of the definition of a cutoff equilibrium for (f, µ), we have
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Bi(f) = ∅. In particular c /∈ Bi(f). Then fc pic i, implying that fc pic ∅ and hence |µ−1(c)| = rc.
Thus, µ is non-wasteful.
Respect of Priorities: Let patient i ∈ I be such that for some category c ∈ C, µ(i) = c while
for some patient j ∈ I, µ(j) = ∅. We show that i pic j, which will conclude that matching µ
respects priorities. By Condition 1(b) of cutoff equilibrium definition, Bj(f) = ∅. In particular,
fc pic j. Since µ(i) = c, by Condition 1(a) of cutoff equilibrium definition, c ∈ Bi(f), implying
that i pic fc. By transitivity of pic, i pic j.
Proof of Lemma 1. We prove the lemma in three claims. Let matching µ ∈M comply with
eligibility requirement, be non-wasteful, and respect priorities.
Claim 1. f
µ
is the maximum equilibrium cutoff vector supporting µ, i.e., (f
µ
, µ) is a cutoff
equilibrium and for every cutoff equilibrium (f, µ), f
µ
c pic fc for every c ∈ C.
Proof. We prove the claim in two parts.
Part 1.We show that (f
µ
, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium:
We restate the definition of f
µ
given in Equation (1) in the main text: For every c ∈ C,
f
µ
c =
{
minpic µ
−1(c) if |µ−1(c)| = rc
∅ otherwise .
By this definition f
µ ∈ F . Moreover, Condition 2 in the definition of a cutoff equilibrium is
trivially satisfied.
We show that Condition 1(a) holds next. Let i ∈ I. If µ(i) = ∅ then Condition 1(a) is
satisfied for i. Suppose µ(i) = c for some c ∈ C. We have i pic minpic µ−1(c). Moreover i pic ∅,
as µ complies with eligibility requirements. Thus, i pic f
µ
c ∈ {∅,minpic µ−1(c)}, and hence,
µ(i) ∈ Bi(fµ), showing Condition 1(a) is satisfied.
Finally, we show that Condition 1(b) is satisfied. We prove its contrapositive. Let i ∈ I be
such that µ(i) 6∈ Bi(fµ). Thus, µ(i) = ∅ by Condition 1(a). Let c ∈ C. If |µ−1(c)| < rc, then
f
µ
c = ∅ pic i by non-wastefulness of µ. If |µ−1(c)| = rc, then j pic i for every j ∈ µ−1(c) as µ
respects priorities; thus, f
µ
c = minpic µ
−1(c) pic i. In either case, we have c 6∈ Bi(fµ). Thus, we
get Bi(fµ) = ∅, showing that Condition 1(b) also holds for (fµ, µ), and hence, completing the
proof that (f
µ
, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium.
Part 2. Let (f, µ) be a cutoff equilibrium. We prove that f
µ
c pic fc for every c ∈ C:
Suppose, for contradiction, that there exists some category c ∈ C such that fc pic fµc . Then
|µ−1(c)| = rc as (f, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium and fc pic ∅, which follows from the fact that fµc pic ∅.
Thus, f
µ
c = minpic µ
−1(c) pic ∅ by definition and µ complying with eligibility requirements. Then
for the patient i = f
µ
c , µ(i) = c 6∈ Bi(f) contradicting that (f, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium.
Thus, such a category c does not exist, and hence, f
µ
is the maximum cutoff equilibrium vector
supporting matching µ. 
Claim 2. fµ is the minimum equilibrium cutoff vector supporting µ, i.e., (fµ, µ) is a cutoff
equilibrium and for every cutoff equilibrium (f, µ), fc pic f
µ
c
for every c ∈ C.
Proof. We prove the claim in two parts.
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Part 1. We show that (fµ, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium:
We restate fµ using its definition in Equation (2): for every c ∈ C,
fµ
c
=
{
minpic
{
i ∈ µ(I) : i pic xc
}
if xc 6= ∅
∅ otherwise
where xc is defined as
xc = max
pic
(
I \ µ(I)) ∪ {∅}.
For every c ∈ C, since xc pic ∅, we have minpic
{
i ∈ µ(I) : i pic xc
}
pic ∅, if xc 6= ∅. Hence, fµc pic ∅
showing that fµ ∈ F .
We show that the conditions in the definition of a cutoff equilibrium are satisfied by (fµ, µ).
Condition 2. Suppose |µ−1(c)| < rc for some c ∈ C. For any i ∈ I \ µ(I) we have ∅ pic i by
non-wastefulness of µ. Thus, xc = ∅. This implies fµc = ∅ by its definition. Hence, Condition 2
is satisfied.
Condition 1(a). Let i ∈ I. If µ(i) = ∅ then Condition 1(a) is satisfied for i. Suppose µ(i) = c
for some c ∈ C. We have i pic fµc , since we showed in Claim 1 that (fµ, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium.
Two cases are possible about µ−1(c):
• If |µ−1(c)| < rc: we showed in proving Condition 2 that xc = ∅, thus, fµc = fµc = ∅. Since
i pic ∅, c = µ(i) ∈ Bi(fµ) showing that Condition 1(a) holds for i.
• If |µ−1(c)| = rc: Then fµc = minpic µ−1(c) pic xc: as otherwise
– if xc ∈ I, then µ(xc) = ∅ (by definition of xc) and yet c ∈ Bxc(fµ), a contradiction to
(f
µ
, µ) being a cutoff equilibrium;
– if xc = ∅, then (i) xc pic fµc ∈ I contradicts fµ being a cutoff vector, and (ii) xc = fµc
contradicts |µ−1(c)| = rc. Thus we cannot have xc pic fµc in this case either.
Thus,
f
µ
c pic minpic
{i ∈ I : i pic xc} = fµc .
Then
i pic f
µ
c pic f
µ
c
,
implying c = µ(i) ∈ Bi(fµ) and showing that Condition 1(a) holds for i.
Condition 1(b). Let i ∈ I be such that Bi(fµ) 6= ∅. Let c ∈ Bi(fµ).
• if xc = ∅: Then i pic ∅ = fµc . By definition of xc, i ∈ µ(I), i.e., µ(i) 6= ∅.
• if xc 6= ∅: Then i pic fµc pic xc, which in turn implies that µ(i) 6= ∅ by definition of fµc and
xc.
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In either case, by Condition 1(a), µ(i) ∈ Bi(fµ). Thus, Condition 1(b) is satisfied for i.
These conclude proving that (fµ, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium.
Part 2. Let (f, µ) be a cutoff equilibrium. We prove that fc pic f
µ
c
for every c ∈ C:
Suppose to the contrary of the claim fµ
c
pic fc for some c ∈ C. Now, fµc is a patient,
because fc pic ∅ by the definition of a cutoff vector. By definition of fµc , xc 6= ∅ and fµc pic xc.
We cannot have xc pic fc, as otherwise, we have c ∈ Bxc(f); however, by definition of xc,
µ(xc) = ∅, contradicting (f, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium. Thus fc pic xc. Since xc is eligible for c,
fc ∈ I. Furthermore, fc ∈ µ(I), since c ∈ Bfc(f) and (f, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium. Therefore,
fc ∈ {j ∈ µ(I) : j pic xc}. Since fµc = minpic{j ∈ µ(I) : j pic xc}, we have fc pic fµc , contradicting
fµ
c
pic fc. Therefore, such a category c cannot exist, and hence, f
µ is the minimum equilibrium
cutoff vector supporting µ. 
Claim 3. For any given two cutoff equilibria (f, µ) and (g, µ) such that fc pic gc for every c ∈ C,
the pair (h, µ) is also a cutoff equilibrium where h ∈ F satisfies for every c ∈ C, fc pic hc pic gc.
Proof. We can obtain cutoff vector h from g after a sequence of repeated applications of the
following operation: Change the cutoffs of one of the categories c ∈ C of an input vector f ′ ∈ F
so that its cutoff increases by one patient and gets closer to hc than f
′
c. We start with f
′ = g to
the sequence. We show that each iteration of this operation results with a new equilibrium cutoff
vector g′ supporting µ and we use this g′ as the input of the next iteration of the operation.
Since the outcome vector gets closer to h at each step, the last cutoff vector of the sequence is
h by finiteness of the patient set, and thus, (h, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium:
Suppose c′ ∈ C is such that hc′ pic′ gc′ . We prove that for cutoff vector g′ ∈ F such that
g′c = gc for every c ∈ C \ {c′} and g′c′ = minpic′{i ∈ I : i pic′ gc′}, (g′, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium. It
is straightforward to show that g′ ∈ F . Observe also that Bi(g′) = Bi(g) for every i ∈ I \ {j}
where j = gc′ . Three cases are possible regarding j:
• If j 6∈ I: j = ∅.
• If j ∈ I and µ(j) = c′: Category c′ ∈ Bj(f) as (f, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium. However,
fc′ pic′ hc′ pic′ j = gc′ , contradicting that c
′ ∈ Bj(f). Therefore, this case cannot happen.
• If j ∈ I and µ(j) 6= c′: Observe that µ(j) 6= ∅, as c′ ∈ Bj(g) and (g, µ) is a cutoff
equilibrium. Moreover, we have µ(j) ∈ Bj(g), in turn together with µ(j) 6= c′ implying
that µ(j) ∈ Bj(g′) as g′µ(j) = gµ(j).
These and the fact that (g, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium (specifically its Condition 1(b)) show that
µ(i) ∈ Bi(g′) for every i ∈ I such that Bi(g′) 6= ∅, proving Condition 1(b) holds in the definition
of cutoff equilibrium for (g′, µ).
Since (g, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium (specifically Conditions 1(a) and 1(b) of the definition)
imply that for every i ∈ I, µ(i) = ∅ ⇐⇒ Bi(g) = ∅. Therefore, we have µ(i) = ∅ for every
i ∈ I such that Bi(g′) = ∅, because Bi(g′) ⊆ Bi(g) = ∅, where the set inclusion follows from the
fact that the cutoffs have weakly increased for each category under g′. This and Condition 1(b)
that we showed above imply that for all i ∈ I, µ(i) ∈ Bi(g′) ∪ {∅}. Thus, Condition 1(a) in the
definition of a cutoff equilibrium is also satisfied by (g′, µ).
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We show Condition 2 is also satisfied proving that for every c ∈ C, g′c = ∅ if |µ−1(c)| < rc to
conclude that (g′, µ) is a cutoff equilibrium. Suppose |µ−1(c)| < rc for some c ∈ C. If c 6= c′, then
g′c = gc = ∅, where the latter equality follows from (g, µ) being a cutoff equilibrium (specifically
its Condition 2). If c = c′, fc′ = ∅ pic′ gc′ , where the first equality follows from (f, µ) being a
cutoff equilibrium (specifically its Condition 2). This contradicts. g ∈ F . So c 6= c′, completing
the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 2.
Sufficiency : We first prove that any DA-induced matching complies with eligibility require-
ments, is non-wasteful, and respects priorities. Let ∈ P be a preference profile of patients over
categories and ∅. Suppose µ ∈M is DA-induced from this preference profile.
Compliance with eligibility requirements: Suppose that µ(i) = c for some c ∈ C. Then i must
apply to c in a step of the DA algorithm, and hence, c i ∅. By construction of i, this means
i pic ∅. Therefore, matching µ complies with eligibility requirements.
Non-wastefulness: Suppose that i pic ∅ and µ(i) = ∅ for some category c ∈ C and patient i ∈ I.
By construction of i, c i ∅ because i is eligible for c. As patient i is unmatched in µ, she
applies to c in some step of the DA algorithm. However, c rejects i at this or a later step. This
means, c should have been holding at least rc offers from eligible patients at this step. From
this step on, c always holds rc offers and eventually all of its units are assigned:
∣∣µ−1(c)∣∣ = rc.
Hence, matching µ is non-wasteful.
Respecting priorities: Suppose that µ(i) = c and µ(i′) = ∅ for two patients i, i′ ∈ I and a
category c ∈ C. For every category c′ ∈ C, pic′ is used to choose eligible patients at every step
of the DA algorithm. Therefore, µ(i) = c implies i pic ∅. Since µ(i′) = ∅, then it must be either
because ∅ pic i′ or because i pic i′. In the first case, we get i pic i′ as well because pic is transitive.
Therefore, matching µ respects priorities.
Necessity: We now prove that any matching µ ∈ M with the three stated properties is DA-
induced from some preference profile. We construct a candidate preference profile ∈ P as
follows:
• Consider a patient i ∈ µ−1(c) where c ∈ C. Since µ complies with eligibility requirements,
i must be eligible for category c. Let i rank category c first in i. The rest of the ranking
in i is arbitrary as long as all eligible categories are ranked above the empty set.
• Consider an unmatched patient i ∈ µ−1(∅). Let i rank categories in any order in i such
that only eligible categories are ranked above the empty set.
We now show that µ is DA-induced from preference profile . In the induced DA algorithm
under, for every category c′ ∈ C, patients in µ−1(c′) apply to category c′ first. Every unmatched
patient j ∈ µ−1(∅) applies to her first-ranked eligible category according to j , if there is any.
Suppose c ∈ C is this category. Since µ respects priorities, j has a lower priority than any patient
in µ−1(c), who also applied to c in Step 1. Furthermore, since µ is non-wasteful,
∣∣µ−1(c)∣∣ = rc (as
there are unmatched eligible patients for this category, for example j). Therefore, all unmatched
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patients in µ are rejected at the first step of the DA algorithm. Moreover, for every category
c′ ∈ C, all patients in µ−1(c′) are tentatively accepted by category c′ at the end of Step 1.
Each unmatched patient in j ∈ µ−1(∅) continues to apply according to j to the other
categories at which she is eligible. Since µ respects priorities and is non-wasteful, she is rejected
from all categories for which she is eligible one at a time, because each of these categories c ∈ C
continues to tentatively hold patients µ−1(c) from Step 1 who all have higher priority than j
according to pic, as µ respects priorities. Moreover, by non-wastefulness of µ,
∣∣µ−1(c)∣∣ = rc, as
there are unmatched eligible patients (for example j) under µ.
As a result, when the algorithm stops, the outcome is such that, for every category c′ ∈ C, all
patients in µ−1(c′) are matched with c′. Moreover, every patient in µ−1(∅) remains unmatched
at the end. Therefore, µ is DA-induced from the constructed patient preferences .
Proof of Proposition 1. Let . ∈ ∆ be a precedence order and ϕ. be the associated sequential
reserve matching. We show that ϕ. is DA-induced from preference profile .= (.i )i∈I .
For every patient i ∈ I, consider another strict preference relation ′i such that all categories
are ranked above the empty set and, furthermore, for any c, c′ ∈ C,
c ′i c′ ⇐⇒ c . c′.
Note that the relative ranking of two categories for which i is eligible is the same between
.i and ′i.
We use an equivalent version of the DA algorithm as the one given in the text. Consider a
Step k: Each patient i who is not tentatively accepted currently by a category applies to the
best category that has not rejected her yet according to ′i. Suppose that Ikc is the union of the
set of patients who were tentatively assigned to category c in Step k− 1 and the set of patients
who just proposed to category c. Category c tentatively assigns eligible patients in Ikc with the
highest priority according to pic until all patients in I
k
c are chosen or all rc units are allocated,
whichever comes first, and permanently rejects the rest.
Since for any category c ∈ C and any patient i ∈ I who is ineligible for category c, ∅ pic c, the
outcome of the DA algorithm when the preference profile is . and ′= (′i)i∈I are the same.
Furthermore, when the preference profile is ′, the DA algorithm works exactly like the
sequential reserve procedure that is used to construct ϕ.. We show this by induction. Suppose
. orders categories as c1 . c2 . . . . . c|C|. As the inductive assumption, for k > 0, suppose
for categories c1, . . . , ck−1, the tentative matches at the end of Step k − 1 and final matches at
the end under the DA algorithm from ′ are identical to their matches in sequential reserve
matching ϕ..
We next consider Step k of the DA algorithm from ′. Only patients who are rejected from
category ck−1 apply in Step k of the DA algorithm and they all apply to category ck. Then ck
uses its priority order pick to tentatively accept the rck highest-priority eligible applicants (and
if there are less than rck eligible applicants, all eligible applicants), and rejects the rest. Observe
that since every patient who is not tentatively accepted by a category c1, . . . , ck−1 applied to
this category in Step k, none of these patients will ever apply to it again; and by the inductive
assumption no patient who is tentatively accepted in categories c1, . . . , ck−1 will ever be rejected,
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and thus, they will never apply to ck, either. Thus, the tentative acceptances by ck will become
permanent at the end of the DA algorithm. Moreover, this step is identical to Step k of the
sequential reserve procedure under precedence order . and the same patients are matched with
category ck in ϕ.. This ends the induction.
Therefore, we conclude that ϕ. is DA-induced from patient preference profile ..
Proof of Proposition 2. Let J., J.
′ ⊆ I be the sets of patients remaining just before category
c is processed under the sequential reserve matching procedure induced by . and .′, respectively.
Since c is processed earlier under .′ and every other category preceding c and c′ under . and .′
are ordered in the same manner order, J. ⊆ J.′ . Two cases are possible:
1. If |ϕ−1.′ (c)| < rc: Then J. ⊆ J.
′
implies |ϕ−1. (c)| < rc. Therefore, by Equation (1),
f
ϕ.′
c = ∅ = fϕ.c .
2. If |ϕ−1.′ (c)| = rc: Then J. ⊆ J.
′
implies,
f
ϕ.′
c = minpic
ϕ−1.′ (c) pic minpic
ϕ−1. (c),
where the first equality follows by Equation (1). By the same equation, f
ϕ.
c ∈ {∅,minpic ϕ−1. (c)}
and by the definition of a cutoff vector, f
ϕ.′
c pic ∅. Thus,
f
ϕ.′
c pic f
ϕ.
c .
A.2 Proofs of Lemma 2, Proposition 4, and Theorem 3 in Section 4
Proof of Lemma 2. By the definition of the smart reserve matching algorithm induced
by assigning n unreserved units subsequently at the beginning, in Step 1.(k) for every k ∈
{0, 1, . . . , |I|}, and for every every matching µ ∈Mk,
• µ(i) = u for every i ∈ Juk , and
• µ(i) 6∈ {u, ∅} and i ∈ Iµ(i) for every i ∈ Jk.
We show that for any i ∈ I \ (Ju|I| ∪ J|I|) there is no matching µ ∈ M|I| such that µ(i) 6∈ {u, ∅}
and i ∈ Iµ(i). Suppose contrary to the claim that such a patient i and matching µ exist. Patient
i is processed in some Step 1.(k). We have i /∈ Juk ∪ Jk ⊆ Ju|I| ∪ J|I|. We have µ ∈ Mk−1 as
Mk−1 ⊇ M|I|. Then |Juk−1| = n, as otherwise we can always match i with u even if we cannot
match her with a preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of when she is processed
under a matching that is maximal in beneficiary assignment, contradicting i /∈ Ju|I| ∪ J|I|. But
then as µ(i) 6∈ {u, ∅} and i ∈ Iµ(i), we have µ ∈Mk and i ∈ Jk, contradicting again i /∈ Ju|I|∪J|I|.
Thus, in Step 2 no patient is matched with a preferential treatment categories that she is
a beneficiary of. These prove ∪c∈C\{u}(σ−1(c) ∩ Ic) is the same set regardless of the matching
σ ∈MnS we choose.
To prove that σ−1(u) is the same for every σ ∈MnS , we consider two cases (for Step 2):
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• If we have a soft reserve system: Then all patients are eligible for the remaining max{0, q−
|Ju|I|∪J|I||} units. Since we assign the patients in I \(Ju|I|∪J|I|) based on priority according
to pi to the remaining units, we have σ(I) is the same patient set regardless of the matching
σ ∈MnS we choose. Since the remaining ru−n unreserved units are assigned to the lowest
priority patients that are matched in any σ ∈ MnS , if any, and µ−1(u) is a fixed set
regardless of which matching µ ∈ M|I| we choose (as we proved above), then σ−1(u) is
the same set regardless of which σ ∈MnS we choose.
• If we have a hard reserve system: Then in Step 2 no patient is matched with a unit of a
category that she is not a beneficiary of. Thus, the ru− n remaining unmatched units are
assigned to the highest pi-priority patients in I \ (Ju|I| ∪ J|I|). This concludes proving that
each of σ(I) and σ−1(u) is the same patient set regardless of which σ ∈MnS we choose.
Proof of Proposition 4. For any n ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ru}, we prove that every smart reserve
matching in MnS complies with eligibility requirements, is non-wasteful, respects priorities, and
is maximal in beneficiary assignment.
Compliance with eligibility requirements: By construction, no patient is ever matched with a
category for which she is not eligible during the procedure.
Non-wastefulness: Suppose to the contrary of the claim that there exists some σ ∈ MnS that is
wasteful. Thus, there exists some category c ∈ C and a patient i ∈ I such that σ(i) = ∅, i pic ∅,
and |µ−1(c)| < rc. Then in Step 2 patient i or another patient should have been matched with
c as we assign all remaining units to eligible patients, which is a contradiction.
Respect for Priorities: Let σ ∈ MnS be a smart reserve matching. Suppose patients i, j ∈ I are
such that i pi j and σ(i) = ∅. We need to show either (i) σ(j) = ∅ or (ii) i 6∈ Iσ(j) and j ∈ Iσ(j),
which is equivalent to j piσ(j) i. Suppose σ(j) 6= ∅. Suppose to the contrary that i ∈ Iσ(j)
and j ∈ Iσ(j). Consider the smart reserve matching procedure with n. Two cases are possible:
j ∈ Ju|I| ∪ J|I| or not. We show that either case leads to a contradiction, showing that σ respects
priorities.
• If j ∈ Ju|I|∪J|I|: Consider the matching σˆ obtained from σ as follows: σˆ(i) = σ(j), σˆ(j) = ∅,
and σˆ(i′) = σ(i′) for every i′ ∈ I \ {i, j}. Since i, j ∈ Iσ(j), and we match i instead of j
with σ(j), σˆ is a matching that is maximal in beneficiary assignment as well. Since i pi j,
i is processed before j in Step 1. Let i be processed in some Step 1.(k). Since σ(i) = ∅,
i 6∈ Jk ∪ Juk . Then σˆ ∈Mk−1 as σ ∈Mk−1. Two cases are possible:
– if σ(j) = u: As j is matched with an unreserved unit in Step 1, then an unreserved
unit is still to be allocated in the procedure when i is to be processed in Step 1.(k)
before j. We try to match i with an unreserved unit first. Since σˆ ∈ Mk−1 and
σˆ(i) = u this implies i ∈ Juk . This contradicts i 6∈ Juk ∪ Jk.
– if σ(j) 6= u: Then when i is to be processed in Step 1.(k), we are trying to match
her (i) if it is possible, with unreserved category u first and if not, with a preferential
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treatment category that she is a beneficiary of, or (ii) directly with a preferential
treatment category that she is a beneficiary of without sacrificing the maximality in
beneficiary assignment. However, as σ(i) = ∅ we failed in doing either. Since i ∈ Iσˆ(i)
and σˆ(i) 6= u, at least there exists a matching in Mk−1 that would match i with a
preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of. Hence, this contradicts
i 6∈ Juk ∪ Jk.
• If j 6∈ Ju|I|∪J|I|: Therefore, j is matched in Step 2 of the smart reserve matching algorithm
with n unreserved units processed first. Since we match patients in Step 2 either with the
preferential treatment categories that they are eligible but not beneficiary of or with the
unreserved category u, and we assumed j ∈ Iσ(j) then σ(j) = u. Since i is also available
when j is matched, and i pi j, patient i or another patient who has higher pi-priority than
j should have been matched instead of j, which is a contradiction.
Maximality in Beneficiary Assignment: By construction MnS ⊆M0, which is the set of match-
ings that are maximal in beneficiary assignment in the smart reserve matching procedure with
n.
The following lemma and concepts from graph theory will be useful in our next proof. We
state the lemma as follows:
Lemma 3 (Mendelsohn and Dulmage Theorem, 1958). Let Mb be the set of matchings that
match patients with only preferential treatment categories that they are beneficiaries of and
otherwise leave them unmatched. If there is a matching in Mb that matches patients in some
J ⊆ I and there is another matching ν ∈ Mb then there exists a matching in Mb that matches
all patients in J and at least |ν−1(c)| units of each category c ∈ C \ {u}.
See for example page 266 of Schrijver (2003) for a proof of this result.
Let us define I∅ = ∅ for notational convenience.
We define a beneficiary alternating path from µ to ν for two matchings in µ, ν ∈M as
a non-empty list A = (i1, . . . , im) of patients such that[
i1 6∈ Iµ(i1) or µ(i1) = u
]
&
[
i1 ∈ Iν(i1) and ν(i1) 6= u
]
,[
im ∈ Iµ(im) and µ(im) = ν(im−1)
]
&
[
im ∈ Iν(im) and ν(im) 6= u
]
for every m ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,m− 1},[
im ∈ Iµ(im) and µ(im) = ν(im−1)
]
&
[
im 6∈ Iν(im) or ν(im) = u
]
.
A beneficiary alternating path begins with a patient i1 who is not matched with a preferential
treatment category that she is a beneficiary of under µ and ends with a patient im who is not
matched with a preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of under ν. Everybody
else in the path is matched under both matchings with a preferential treatment category that she
is a beneficiary of. We state the following observation, which directly follows from the finiteness
of categories and patients.
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Observation 1. If µ and ν ∈M are two matchings such that for every c ∈ C\{u}, |µ−1(c)∩Ic| =
|ν−1(c)∩ Ic| and there exists some i ∈
(∪c∈C\{u} ν−1(c)∩ Ic) \ (∪c∈C\{u} µ−1(c)∩ Ic), then there
exists a beneficiary alternating path from µ to ν beginning with patient i.
We are ready to prove our last theorem:
Proof of Theorem 3. By Proposition 4 and Theorem 1, any σ0 ∈ M0S and σru ∈ MruS
are cutoff equilibrium matchings. Let µ ∈ M be any other cutoff equilibrium matching that is
maximal in beneficiary assignment.
We extend the definitions of our concepts to smaller economies: given any I∗ ⊆ I and
r∗ = (r∗c )c∈C such that r∗c ≤ rc for every c ∈ C, all properties and algorithms are redefined for
this smaller economy (I∗, r∗) by taking the restriction of the baseline priority order pi on I∗, and
denoted using the argument (I∗, r∗) at the end of the notation. For example M(I∗, r∗) denotes
the set of matchings for (I∗, r∗).
Proof of f
σru
u pi f
µ
u:
We prove the following claim first.
Claim 1. For any set of patients I∗ ⊆ I and any capacity vector r∗ ≤ r, suppose matching
ν ∈M(I∗, r∗) is maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗). Let σ ∈Mr∗uS (I∗, r∗) be a smart
reserve matching with all unreserved units processed first. Then
|σ−1(u)| ≥ |ν−1(u)|.
Moreover, according to the baseline priority order pi, for any k ∈
{
1, . . . ,
∣∣ν−1(u) \ σ−1(u)∣∣},
let jk be the k
th highest priority patient in σ−1(u) \ ν−1(u) and j′k be the kth highest priority
patient in ν−1(u) \ σ−1(u), then
jk pi j
′
k.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary of the first statement |σ−1(u)| < |ν−1(u)|. Since both σ and ν
are maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗), then the exists some patient i ∈ (∪c∈Cν−1(c)∩
Ic) \ (∪c∈Cσ−1(c) ∩ Ic). This patient is not committed to be matched in Step 1 of the smart
reserve matching algorithm with all unreserved units first, despite the fact that there exists at
least one available unreserved unit when she was processed, which is a contradiction. Thus,
|σ−1(u)| ≥ |ν−1(u)|.
For the rest of the proof, we use induction on the cardinality of I∗ and on the magnitude of
vector of category capacity vector r∗:
• For the base case when I∗ = ∅ and r∗c = 0 for every c ∈ C, the claim holds trivially.
• As the inductive assumption, suppose that for all capacity vectors of categories bounded
above by vector r∗ and all subsets of I bounded above by cardinality k∗, the claim holds.
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• Consider a set of patients I∗ ⊆ I such that |I∗| = k∗ and capacity vector of categories
r∗ = (r∗c )c∈C . Let σ ∈ Mr
∗
u
S (I
∗, r∗) be a smart reserve matching for (I∗, r∗) with all
unreserved units processed first and ν ∈ M(I∗, r∗) be maximal in beneficiary assignment
for (I∗, r∗). If σ−1(u) ⊇ ν−1(u) then the claim for (I∗, r∗) is trivially true. Thus, suppose
not. Then, there exists j ∈ ν−1(u) \ σ−1(u). Moreover, let j be the highest pi-priority
patient in ν−1(u) \ σ−1(u). We have two cases that we consider separately:
Case 1. There is no patient i ∈ I∗ such that i pi j and i ∈ σ−1(u) \ ν−1(u):
We show that this case leads to a contradiction, and hence, it cannot hold.
When j is processed in Step 1 of the smart reserve matching algorithm with all
unreserved units processed first, since σ(j) 6= u, either
(i) all units of the unreserved category are assigned under σ to patients with higher
pi-priority than j, or
(ii) some unreserved category units are still available when j is processed.
Observe that (i) cannot hold, because it contradicts Case 1. Thus, (ii) holds.
Since j is the highest pi-priority patient in ν−1(u) \ σ−1(u) and since we are in Case
1, for every i ∈ I∗ such that i pi j, we have
ν(i) = u ⇐⇒ σ(i) = u. (3)
We construct a new matching νˆ ∈M(I∗, r∗) from ν and fix a patient i ∈ I∗ as follows.
We check whether there exists a patient i ∈ I∗ such that
i pi j, σ(i) 6= u, and i 6∈ Iν(i), (4)
(a) If such a patient i does not exist, then let νˆ = ν and i = j.
(b) If such a patient i exists, then let her be the highest pi-priority patient with the
property in Equation 4.
We show that i ∈ Iσ(i). Consider the smart reserve matching algorithm. Since
ν(j) = u and i pi j, just before i is processed in Step 1, there is still at least one
unreserved unit available by Equation 3. Since we are processing all unreserved
units first and since σ(i) 6= u, it should be the case that we had to match i with
a preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of. Thus, i ∈ Iσ(i).
We create a new matching for (I∗, r∗) from ν, which we refer to as νˆ, such that
νˆ matches every patient in I∗ exactly as under ν except that νˆ leaves patient
j unmatched and matches i with category u instead. Since ν is maximal in
beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗), so is νˆ.
So far, we have for every i′ ∈ I∗ such that i′ pi i,
1. σ(i′) = u ⇐⇒ ν(i′) = u (by Equation 3 and i pi j),
2. σ(i′) ∈ Iσ(i′) (an unreserved unit is available before i is processed in Step 1 of
the smart reserve matching algorithm with all unreserved units processed first;
thus, every patient processed before i is matched if possible, with u, and if not
possible, with a preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of under
the restriction of maximality in beneficiary assignment), and
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3. νˆ(i′) ∈ Iνˆ(i′) (by definition of i as the highest pi-priority patient satisfying Equa-
tion 4).
We also have νˆ(i) = u and σ(i) 6= u.
Patient i is processed in some Step 1.(k) in the smart reserve matching algorithm
with all unreserved units processed first. As σ(i) 6= u we have i /∈ Juk (I∗, r∗). On
the other hand, since σ ∈ Mk−1(I∗, r∗), by Statements 1, 2, and 3 above, we have
νˆ ∈ Mk−1(I∗, r∗) as well and it matches i with u, contradicting i /∈ Juk (I∗, r∗).
Therefore, Case 1 (ii) cannot hold either.
Case 2. There is some i ∈ σ−1(u) \ ν−1(u) such that i pi j:
Construct a matching σˆ from σ that it leaves every patient who is matched in Step
2 of the smart reserve matching algorithm with all unreserved units processed first:
for every i∗ ∈ I∗, σˆ(i∗) = σ(i∗) if i∗ ∈ Iσ(i∗) and σˆ(i∗) = ∅ otherwise. Clearly
σˆ ∈ M(I∗, r∗) and is maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗), since σ is. By
Lemma 3, there exists a matching ν˜ ∈Mb(I∗, r∗)17 such that under ν˜ all patients in
∪c∈C\{u}ν˜−1(c)∩ Ic are matched with the preferential treatment categories in C \ {u}
that they are beneficiaries of, and for every c ∈ C \ {u}, |ν˜−1(c) ∩ Ic| = |σˆ−1(c) ∩ Ic|
(equality follows rather than ≥ as dictated by the lemma, because σˆ is maximal
in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗)). For every i∗ ∈ I∗, we have ν(i∗) = u =⇒
ν˜(i∗) = ∅ as νˆ ∈Mb(I∗, r∗). We modify ν˜ to obtain νˆ: For every i∗ ∈ ν−1(u), we set
νˆ(i∗) = u and for every i∗ ∈ I∗ \ ν−1(u), we set νˆ(i∗) = ν˜(i∗). Clearly, νˆ ∈M(I∗, r∗)
and is maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗), since ν is. We will work with
σˆ and νˆ instead of σ and ν from now on.
Recall that σˆ(i) = u and νˆ(i) 6= u. Two cases are possible: i ∈ Iνˆ(i) or νˆ(i) = ∅.
1. If i ∈ Iνˆ(i): Then by Observation 1, there exists a beneficiary alternating path
A from σˆ to νˆ beginning with i and ending with some i′ ∈ I∗ such that (i)
σˆ(i′) ∈ Iσˆ(i′) and σˆ(i′) 6= u, and (ii) νˆ(i′) = u or νˆ(i′) = ∅.
By the existence of the beneficiary alternating path, it is possible to match either
i or i′ with a preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of and
match the other one with u without changing the type of match of any other
patient i∗ ∈ I∗ \{i, i′} has, i.e., either i∗ is matched with a preferential treatment
category under both matchings or not. Yet, when i is processed in Step 1 of the
smart reserve matching algorithm with all unreserved units processed first, we
chose i to be matched with u and i′ with a preferential treatment category. This
means
i pi i′.
Let cˆ 6= u be the category that i is matched with under νˆ.
If σˆ(i′) 6= u, then modify νˆ by assigning an unreserved unit to i′ instead of j:
νˆ(j) = ∅ and νˆ(i′) = u. Otherwise, do not modify νˆ any further.
17As defined in the hypothesis of the lemma, ν˜ ∈Mb(I∗, r∗) means that for every i∗ ∈ I∗ and c ∈ C, i∗ ∈ ν˜−1(c)
implies c 6= u and i∗ ∈ Ic.
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Consider the smaller economy (I ′, r′) such that I ′ = I∗ \ {i, i′} and for every
c ∈ C, r′c = r∗c − 1 if c ∈ {cˆ, u} and r′c = r∗c , otherwise.
We show that a smart reserve matching σ′ ∈Mr′uS (I ′, r′) can be obtained from the
original smart reserve matching σ ∈Mr∗uS (I∗, r∗) and νˆ. Consider the beneficiary
alternating path A we discovered above starting with patient i and ending with
patient i′ from σˆ to νˆ: Suppose A = (i, i2, . . . , im−1, i′). Define
σ′(i∗) = σ(i∗) for every i∗ ∈ I ′ \ {i2, . . . , im−1} and
σ′(i∗) = νˆ(i∗) for every i∗ ∈ {i2, . . . , im−1}.
Observe that σ′ ∈M(I ′, r′). The existence of σ′ shows that it is feasible to match
every patient in Ju|I∗|(I
∗, r∗)\{i} with u and it is feasible to match every patient in
J|I∗|(I∗, r∗) \ {i′} with a preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary
of in (I ′, r′). Thus, the smart reserve matching algorithm with all unreserved
units processed first proceeds exactly in the same manner as it does for (I∗, r∗)
with the exception that it skips patients i and i′ in the smaller economy (I ′, r′).
Hence, σ′ ∈Mr′uS (I ′, r′).
Let the restriction of matching νˆ to (I ′, r′) be ν ′. Observe that ν ′ is a matching
for (I ′, r′). Moreover, it is maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I ′, r′), since νˆ
is maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗).
Now one of the two following cases holds for ν:
(a) If ν(i′) 6= u: Recall that while ν(j) = u, we updated νˆ so that νˆ(i′) = u
and νˆ(j) = ∅. Thus, ν ′(j) = ∅ as well. Since i pi j, this together with the
inductive assumption that the claim holds for (I ′, r′) imply that the claim
also holds for (I∗, r∗), completing the induction.
(b) If ν(i′) = u: Since i pi i′, this together with the inductive assumption that the
claim holds for (I ′, r′) imply that the claim also holds for (I∗, r∗), completing
the induction.
2. If νˆ(i) = ∅: Recall that νˆ(j) = u. We modify νˆ further that νˆ(i) = u and
νˆ(j) = ∅. Consider the smaller economy (I ′, r′) where I ′ = I∗ \ {i}, r′u = r∗u − 1,
and r′c = r∗c for every c ∈ C \ {u}.
Let σ′ and ν ′ be the restrictions of σ and νˆ to (I ′, r′), respectively. Since, σ(i) =
νˆ(i) = u both σ′ and ν ′ are matchings for (I ′, r′). Since the capacity of category
u is decreased by one, σ′ is a smart reserve matching with all unreserved units
processed first for (I ′, r′). To see this observe that the algorithm proceeds as it
does for (I∗, r∗) with the exception that it skips i. Matching ν ′ is maximal in
beneficiary assignment for (I ′, r′). Therefore, by the inductive assumption, the
claim holds for (I ′, r′). This together with the fact that i pi j imply the claim
holds for (I∗, r∗), completing the induction. 
If |µ−1(u)| < ru then fσruu pi fµu = ∅. On the other hand, if |µ−1(u)| = ru, Claim 1 implies
that f
σru
u = minpi σ
−1
ru (u) pi f
µ
u = minpi µ
−1(u).
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Proof of f
µ
u pi f
σ0
u :
We prove the following claim first.
Claim 2. For any set of patients I∗ ⊆ I and any capacity vector r∗ ≤ r, suppose ν ∈M(I∗, r∗)
is a matching that is maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗). Let σ ∈ M0S(I∗, r∗) be a
smart reserve matching with all unreserved units processed last,
J = ∪c∈C\{u}(σ−1(c) ∩ Ic), and J ′ = ∪c∈C\{u}(ν−1(c) ∩ Ic).
According to the baseline priority order pi, for any k ∈ {1, . . . , |J ′ \ J |}, let jk be the kth highest
priority patient in J \ J ′ and j′k be the kth highest priority patient in J ′ \ J , then
jk pi j
′
k.
Proof.18 We use induction on the cardinality of I∗ and on the magnitude of vector of capacities
of categories r∗:
• For the base case when I∗ = ∅ and r∗c = 0 for every c ∈ C, the claim holds trivially.
• In the inductive step, suppose for every capacity of categories bounded above by vector r∗
and subsets of patients in I bounded above by cardinality k∗ the claim holds.
• Consider set of patients I∗ ⊆ I such that |I∗| = k∗ and capacity vector for categories
r∗ = (r∗c )c∈C . If J \J ′ = ∅ then the claim holds trivially. Suppose J \J ′ 6= ∅. Let i ∈ J \J ′
be the highest priority patient in J \ J ′ according to pi.
We have |J | = |J ′| by maximality of σ and ν in beneficiary assignment for I∗. Thus,
|J \ J ′| = |J ′ \ J |, which implies J ′ \ J 6= ∅.
By Lemma, 3 there exists a matching νˆ ∈ Mb(I∗, r∗) that matches patients only with
preferential treatment categories that they are beneficiaries of such that νˆ matches patients
in J ′ and |σ−1(c)∩Ic| units reserved for every preferential treatment category c ∈ C\{u}.19
Since both ν and σ are maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗), then only patients
in J ′ should be matched under νˆ and no other patients (as otherwise ν would not be
maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I∗, r∗)).
Since νˆ(i) = ∅, i ∈ Iσ(i), and σ(i) 6= u, by Observation 1, there exists a beneficiary
alternating path A starting with i from νˆ to σ and ending with a patient i′ ∈ Iνˆ(i′) (and
νˆ(i′) 6= u by its construction), and yet i′ /∈ Iσ(i) or σ(i′) = u.
Existence of the beneficiary alternating path shows that it is possible to match i or i′
(but not both) with preferential treatment categories that they are beneficiaries of without
affecting anybody else’s status as committed or uncommitted in Step 1 of the smart reserve
18This claim’s proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 Part 2 in So¨nmez and Yenmez (2020).
19Although both σ and ν may be matching some patients with categories that they are not beneficiaries of or
with the unreserved category, we can simply leave those patients unmatched in σ and ν and apply Lemma 3 to
see such a matching νˆ exists.
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matching algorithm with all unreserved units processed last. Since σ matches i with a
preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of at the cost of patient i′, we
have
i pi i′.
Next consider the smaller economy (I ′, r′) in which we remove (i) i and i′ and set I ′ =
I∗ \ {i, i′}, (ii) one of the units associated with preferential treatment category cˆ = νˆ(i′)
and set r′cˆ = r
∗
cˆ −1, and (iii) keep the capacity of every other category c ∈ C \{cˆ} the same
and set r′c = r∗c .
Let ν ′ be the restriction of νˆ to (I ′, r′). As νˆ(i) = ∅, νˆ(i′) = cˆ 6= u such that i ∈ Icˆ and
the capacity of cˆ is reduced by 1 in the smaller economy, ν ′ ∈M(I ′, r′), and furthermore,
it is maximal in beneficiary assignment for (I ′, r′).
We form a matching σ′ ∈M(I ′, r′) by modifying σ and νˆ using the beneficiary alternating
path A we found before. Recall that A is the beneficiary alternating path from νˆ to σ
beginning with i and ending with i′. Suppose A = (i, i2, . . . , im−1, i′). Define
σ′(i∗) = σ(i∗) for every i∗ ∈ I ′ \ {i2, . . . , im−1} and
σ′(i∗) = νˆ(i∗) for every i∗ ∈ {i2, . . . , im−1}.
Observe that σ′ ∈ M(I ′, r′). The existence of σ′ shows that it is possible to match every
patient in J|I∗|(I∗, r∗)\{i} with a preferential treatment category that she is a beneficiary of
in (I ′, r′). Thus, the smart reserve matching algorithm with all unreserved units processed
last proceeds as it does for (I∗, r∗) with the exception that it skips patients i and i′.
Therefore, σ′ ∈M0S(I ′, r′).
By the inductive assumption, the claim holds for σ′ and ν ′ for (I ′, r′). This completes the
induction, as we already showed i pi i′. 
Thus, we showed that at the end of Step 1 of the smart matching algorithm with all un-
reserved units processed last, weakly lower priority patients have remained uncommitted in
J∗ = I \ J|I| = I \ ∪c∈C\{u}(σ−10 (c) ∩ Ic) than in Jˆ = I \ ∪c∈C\{u}(µ−1(c) ∩ Ic).
Two cases are possible:
• If we have a soft reserves system: As both σ0 and µ are maximal in beneficiary assignment,
an equal number of units are assigned to the highest pi-priority patients in Jˆ (by Step 2 of
the smart reserve matching algorithm) and J∗ (as by Theorem 1, µ respects priorities and
is non-wasteful). Under σ0, the unreserved units are assigned last in order in Step 2 of
the algorithm. On the other hand, the remainder of µ, i.e., the units assigned to the non-
beneficiaries of preferential treatment categories and beneficiaries of u, can be constructed
by assigning the rest of the units sequentially to the highest priority patients in J∗ one by
one when unreserved units are not necessarily processed last.
Therefore, if |µ−1(u)| < ru then |σ−10 (u)| < ru, in turn implying f
µ
u = f
σ0
u = ∅. If
|µ−1(u)| = ru then |σ−10 (u)| ≤ ru and f
µ
u = minpi µ
−1(u) pi fσ0u ∈ {∅,minpi σ−10 (u)}.
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• If we have a hard reserves system: The proof is identical as the above case with the
exception that now only unreserved units are assigned as both σ0 and µ comply with
eligibility requirements.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3 in Section 4
In this subsection, we first show some lemmas that we will use in the proof of Proposition 3.
Fix a soft reserve system induced by the baseline priority order pi. Suppose each patient is
a beneficiary of at most one preferential treatment category.
First, we introduce some concepts.
We introduce function τ : I → (C \ {u}) ∪ {∅} to denote the preferential treatment category
that a patient is beneficiary of, if there is such a category. That is, for any patient i ∈ I, if i ∈ Ic
for some c ∈ C \ {u}, then τ(i) = c, and if i ∈ Ig, i.e., i is a general-community patient, then
τ(i) = ∅.
For a category c∗ ∈ C, a set of patients I˜ ⊆ I, and a patient i ∈ I˜, let rank(i; I˜ , pic∗) denote
the rank of i among patients in I˜ according to pic∗ .
We consider incomplete orders of precedence. For a given subset of categories C∗ ⊆ C, we
define an order of precedence on C∗ as a linear order on C∗. Let ∆(C∗) be the set of orders
of precedence on C∗.
We extend the definition of sequential reserve matchings to cover incomplete precedence
orders and match a subset of patients I˜ ⊆ I as follows: A sequential reserve matching
induced by . ∈ ∆(C∗) over I˜ is the outcome of the sequential reserve procedure which
processes only the categories in C∗ in the order of . to match only the patients in I˜ and leaves
all categories in C \C∗ unmatched and patients in I \ I˜ unmatched. Let ϕI˜. denote this matching.
Lemma 4. Suppose that I˜ ⊆ I, c ∈ C \ {u}, and ., .′ ∈ ∆({u, c}) are such that
• . is given as u . c,
• .′ is given as c .′ u,
• I(2) = I˜ \ µ(I˜) where µ = ϕI˜.,
• I ′(2) = I˜ \ µ′(I˜) where µ′ = ϕI˜.′, and
• µ(I˜c) ( I˜c.
Then the following results hold:
1. |I(2) \ I ′(2)| = |I ′(2) \ I(2)|,
2. I ′(2) \ I(2) ⊆ I˜c,
3. I(2) \ I ′(2) ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c,
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4. if i ∈ I(2) \ I ′(2) and i′ ∈ I ′(2), then i pi i′, and
5. if i′ ∈ I ′(2) \ I(2) and i ∈ I(2) ∩ Ic, then i′ pi i.
Proof of Lemma 4. The first statement in Lemma 4 holds because under soft reserves
every patient is eligible for every category, which implies that |µ(I˜)| = |µ′(I˜)|. As a result,
|µ(I˜)\µ′(I˜)| = |µ′(I˜)\µ(I˜)|, which is equivalent to |I ′(2)\I(2)| = |I(2)\I ′(2)| since µ(I˜)\µ′(I˜) =
I ′(2) \ I(2) and µ′(I˜) \ µ(I˜) = I(2) \ I ′(2).
The second statement in Lemma 4 holds because if i ∈ µ−1(u), then rank(i; I˜ , pi) ≤ ru.
Therefore, i ∈ µ′(I˜). Furthermore, every i ∈ µ−1(c) is a category-c patient since there exists
j ∈ I˜c such that j /∈ µ(I˜). As a result, we get
I˜c ⊇ µ−1(c) ⊇ µ(I˜) \ µ′(I˜) = I ′(2) \ I(2).
To prove the third statement in Lemma 4, suppose for contradiction that there exists i ∈
I(2) \ I ′(2) such that i ∈ I˜c. Therefore, i ∈ µ′(I˜) \ µ(I˜) = I(2) \ I ′(2). By the first statement
in Lemma 4, |I ′(2) \ I(2)| = |I(2) \ I ′(2)| ≥ 1 because I(2) \ I ′(2) has at least one patient. By
the second statement in Lemma 4, I ′(2) \ I(2) ⊆ I˜c. Therefore, there exists i′ ∈ I ′(2) \ I(2) =
µ(I˜) \ µ′(I˜) such that i′ ∈ I˜c. Since i ∈ µ′(I˜), i′ /∈ µ′(I˜), and τ(i) = τ(i′), we get
i pi i′.
Likewise, i′ ∈ µ(I˜), i /∈ µ(I˜), and τ(i) = τ(i′) imply
i′ pi i.
The two displayed relations above contradict each other.
The fourth statement in Lemma 4 is true because for every i ∈ I(2) \ I ′(2) = µ′(I˜) \ µ(I˜)
we know that i /∈ I˜c by the third statement in Lemma 4. Since µ(I˜c) ( I˜c, there are at least
rc patients in I˜c. Therefore, µ
′−1(c) ⊆ I˜c, which implies that i ∈ µ′−1(u). Since i′ ∈ I ′(2) is
equivalent to i′ /∈ µ′(I˜), we get i pi i′.
The fifth statement in Lemma 4 follows from i, i′ ∈ I˜c, i′ ∈ µ(I˜), and i /∈ µ(I˜).
Lemma 5. Suppose that c, c′ ∈ C \ {u} are different categories. Let I˜ ⊆ I and ., .′ ∈ ∆({c, c′})
be such that
• . is given as c′ . c,
• .′ is given as c .′ c′,
• I(2) = I˜ \ µ(I˜) where µ = ϕI˜.,
• I ′(2) = I˜ \ µ′(I˜) where µ′ = ϕI˜.′, and
• µ(I˜c) ( I˜c.
Then the following results hold:
1. |I(2) \ I ′(2)| = |I ′(2) \ I(2)|,
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2. I ′(2) \ I(2) ⊆ I˜c,
3. I(2) \ I ′(2) ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c,
4. if i ∈ I(2) \ I ′(2) and i′ ∈ I ′(2), then i pi i′, and
5. if i′ ∈ I ′(2) \ I(2) and i ∈ I(2) ∩ I˜c, then i′ pi i.
Proof of Lemma 5. If |I˜c′ | ≥ rc′ , then µ(I˜) = µ′(I˜) and, therefore, I(2) = I ′(2). Then all
the statements in Lemma 5 hold trivially. Suppose that |I˜c′ | < rc′ for the rest of the proof.
The first statement in Lemma 5 follows as in the proof of the first statement in Lemma 4.
The second statement in Lemma 5 holds because if i ∈ µ−1(c′) and i ∈ I˜c′ , then i ∈ µ′(I˜)
since |I˜c′ | < rc′ . If i ∈ µ−1(c′) and i /∈ I˜c′ , then rank(i; I˜ \ I˜c′ , pi) ≤ rc′ − |I˜c′ |. As a result
i ∈ µ′(I˜). These two statements imply that µ−1(c′) ⊆ µ′(I˜). Furthermore, every i ∈ µ−1(c) is a
category-c patient since there exists i ∈ I˜c such that i /∈ µ(I˜). As a result, we get that
I ′(2) \ I(2) = µ(I˜) \ µ′(I˜) = µ−1(c) \ µ′(I˜) ⊆ µ−1(c) ⊆ I˜c.
The proof of the third statement in Lemma 5 is the same as the proof of the third statement
in Lemma 4.
The fourth statement in Lemma 5 is true because for every i ∈ I(2) \ I ′(2) = µ′(I˜) \µ(I˜) we
know that i /∈ I˜c by the third statement in Lemma 5. Moreover, µ′−1(c) ⊆ I˜c, as there exists
j ∈ I˜c such that j 6∈ µ(I˜), which implies that there are at least rc category-c patients. This
implies i ∈ µ′−1(c′). Furthermore, i /∈ I˜c′ because I˜c′ ⊆ µ(I˜), which follows from |I˜c′ | < rc′ .
Consider i′ ∈ I ′(2). Then i′ /∈ µ′(I˜), which implies that i pi i′ because µ′(i) = c′, τ(i) 6= c′, and
µ′(i′) = ∅.
The proof of the fifth statement in Lemma 5 is the same as the proof of the fifth statement
in Lemma 4.
Lemma 6. Suppose that c ∈ C \ {u} and c′, c∗ ∈ C \ {c} are different categories. Let I˜ ⊆ I and
., .′ ∈ ∆({c, c′, c∗}) be such that
• . is given as c′ . c . c∗,
• .′ is given as c .′ c′ .′ c∗,
• I(3) = I˜ \ µ(I˜) where µ = ϕI˜.,
• I ′(3) = I˜ \ µ′(I˜) where µ′ = ϕI˜.′, and
• µ(I˜c) ( I˜c.
Then the following results hold:
1. |I(3) \ I ′(3)| = |I ′(3) \ I(3)|,
2. I ′(3) \ I(3) ⊆ I˜c,
3. I(3) \ I ′(3) ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c, and
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4. If i′ ∈ I ′(3) \ I(3) and i ∈ I(3) ∩ I˜c, then i′ pi i.
Proof of Lemma 6. The first statement in Lemma 6 follows as in the proof of the first
statement in Lemma 4. Likewise, the fourth statement in Lemma 6 follows as in the proof of
the fifth statement in Lemma 4.
To show the other two statements, we use Lemma 4 and Lemma 5. Let .ˆ, .ˆ′ ∈ ∆({c, c′}) be
such that
.ˆ : c′ .ˆ c and .ˆ′ : c .ˆ′ c′.
Let I(2) = I˜\ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜) and I ′(2) = I˜\ϕI˜.ˆ′(I˜). Then I(3) = I(2)\µ−1(c∗) and I ′(3) = I ′(2)\µ′−1(c∗).
For both precedence orders . and .′ under the sequential reserve matching procedure, con-
sider the beginning of the third step, at which category c∗ is processed. For ., the set of
available patients is I(2). For .′, the set of available patients is I ′(2). If I(2) = I ′(2), then all
the statements hold trivially because in this case we get I(3) = I ′(3). Therefore, assume that
I(2) 6= I ′(2). For every precedence order, rc∗ patients with the highest priority with respect to
pic∗ are chosen.
We consider each patient chosen under . and .′ for category c∗ one at a time in sequence
with respect to the priority order pic∗ . For both precedence orders there are rc∗ patients matched
with c∗ because µ(I˜c) ( I˜c. Let ik be the kth patient chosen under . for c∗ and i′k be the kth
patient chosen under .′ for c∗ where k = 1, . . . , rc∗ . Let Jk be the set of patients available when
we process . for the kth patient and J ′k be the set of patients available when we process .
′ for
the kth patient where k = 1, . . . , rc∗ . For k = 1, Jk = I(2) and J
′
k = I
′(2). By definition,
Jk+1 = Jk \ {ik} and J ′k+1 = J ′k \ {i′k}. We show that
(a) J ′k \ Jk ⊆ I˜c,
(b) Jk \ J ′k ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c, and
(c) if i ∈ Jk \ J ′k and i′ ∈ (Jk ∩ J ′k) \ I˜c∗ , then i pic∗ i′.
by mathematical induction on k. These three claims trivially hold for k = 1 by Statements 2,
3, and 4 in Claims 1 and 2.
Fix k. In the inductive step, assume that Statements (a), (b), and (c) hold for k. Consider
k + 1. If Jk+1 = J
′
k+1, then the statements trivially hold. Assume that Jk+1 6= J ′k+1 which
implies that J` 6= J ′` for ` = 1, . . . , k. There are four cases depending on which sets ik and i′k
belong to. We consider each case separately.
Case 1: ik ∈ Jk \ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k ∩ Jk. Then
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = J ′k \ Jk
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) =
(
(Jk \ J ′k) \ {ik}
) ∪ {i′k}.
By Statement (a) of the inductive assumption for k, J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = J ′k \ Jk ⊆ I˜c. Therefore,
Statement (a) holds for k + 1.
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As J ′k 6= Jk and |Jk| = |J ′k| because of the soft-reserves condition, J ′k \ Jk has at least one
category-c patient. Moreover, this patient has higher priority with respect to pic∗ than any other
category-c patient in J ′k ∩ Jk because the former is chosen under . while the later is not chosen
under .. Therefore, i′k cannot be a category-c patient. As a result, Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c, so
Statement (b) holds for k + 1.
To show Statement (c) for k + 1, observe that Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = ((Jk \ J ′k) \ {ik}) ∪ {i′k} and
Jk+1 ∩ J ′k+1 = (Jk ∩ J ′k) \ {i′k}). Therefore, Statement (c) for k + 1 follows from Statement (c)
for k and the fact that i′k pic∗ i for any i ∈ Jk+1 ∩ J ′k+1.
Case 2: ik ∈ Jk \ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k \ Jk. Then,
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = (J ′k \ Jk) \ {i′k}
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = (Jk \ J ′k) \ {ik}.
Therefore, J ′k+1\Jk+1 ⊆ I˜c and Jk+1\J ′k+1 ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c by Statements (a) and (b) for k, respectively,
implying Statements (a) and (b) for k + 1.
To show Statement (c) for k+1, observe that Jk+1 \J ′k+1 = (Jk \J ′k)\{ik} and Jk+1∩J ′k+1 =
Jk ∩ J ′k. Therefore, Statement (c) for k + 1 follows from Statement (c) for k trivially.
Case 3: ik ∈ Jk ∩ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k ∩ Jk. In this case, ik = i′k, then
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = J ′k \ Jk
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = Jk \ J ′k.
Therefore, Statements (a) and (b) for k + 1 follows from the respective statements for k.
To show Statement (c) for k + 1, observe that Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = Jk \ J ′k and Jk+1 ∩ J ′k+1 =
(Jk ∩ J ′k) \ {ik}. Therefore, Statement (c) for k + 1 follows from Statement (c) for k trivially.
Case 4: ik ∈ Jk∩J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k \Jk. We argue that this case is not possible. Since i′k ∈ J ′k \Jk,
i′k must be a category-c patient by Statement (a) for k. If c
∗ = u, then every patient in Jk \ J ′k
has a higher priority with respect to pi than every patient in Jk ∩J ′k, which cannot happen since
ik ∈ Jk ∩J ′k. Therefore, c∗ 6= u. Since i′k is a category-c patient, there must not be a category-c∗
patient in J ′k. By Statement (c) for k, we know that every patient in Jk \J ′k has a higher priority
with respect to pic∗ than every patient in (Jk ∩ J ′k) \ Ic∗ = Jk ∩ J ′k. This is a contradiction to
ik ∈ Jk ∩ J ′k. Therefore, Case 4 is not possible.
Since I(3) = Jrc∗ and I
′(3) = J ′rc∗ , Statements 2 and 3 in Lemma 6 follow from Statements
(a) and (b) above, respectively.
Lemma 7. Suppose that c ∈ C \ {u} and c′, c∗, c˜ ∈ C \ {c} are different categories. Let I˜ ⊆ I
and ., .′ ∈ ∆({c, c′, c∗, c˜}) be such that
• . is given as c′ . c . c∗ . c˜,
• .′ is given as c .′ c′ .′ c∗ .′ c˜,
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• I(4) = I˜ \ µ(I˜) where µ = ϕI˜.,
• I ′(4) = I˜ \ µ′(I˜) where µ′ = ϕI˜.′, and
• µ(I˜c) ( I˜c.
Then the following results hold:
1. |I(4) \ I ′(4)| = |I ′(4) \ I(4)|,
2. I(4) \ I ′(4) ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c,
3. if i′ ∈ I ′(4) \ I(4), i′ /∈ I˜c, and i ∈ I(4), then i′ pi i, and
4. if i′ ∈ I ′(4) \ I(4), i′ ∈ I˜c, and i ∈ I(4) ∩ I˜c, then i′ pi i.
Proof of Lemma 7. The first statement in Lemma 7 follows as in the proof of the first
statement in Lemma 4. Likewise, the fourth statement in Lemma 7 follows as in the proof of
the fifth statement in Lemma 4.
To prove the other two statements, we use Lemma 6. Let .ˆ, .ˆ′ ∈ ∆({c, c′, c∗}) be such that
.ˆ : c′ .ˆ c .ˆ c∗ and .ˆ′ : c .ˆ′ c′ .ˆ′ c∗.
Let I(3) = I˜ \ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜) and I ′(3) = I˜ \ϕI˜.ˆ′(I˜). Then I(4) = I(3)\µ−1(c˜) and I ′(4) = I ′(3)\µ′−1(c˜).
For both precedence orders . and .′ under the sequential reserve matching procedure, con-
sider the beginning of the fourth step, at which category c˜ is processed. For ., the set of available
patients is I(3). For .′, the set of available patients is I ′(3). If I(3) = I ′(3), then I(4) = I ′(4)
which implies all the statements in Lemma 7. Therefore, assume that I(3) 6= I ′(3). For every
precedence order, rc˜ patients with the highest priority with respect to pic˜ are chosen.
We consider each patient chosen under . and .′ for category c˜ one at a time in sequence with
respect to the priority order pic˜. Since µ(I˜c) ( I˜c, rc˜ patients are matched with c˜ under both
precedence orders. Let ik be the k
th patient chosen under . for c˜ and i′k be the k
th patient chosen
under .′ for c˜ where k = 1, . . . , rc˜. Let Jk be the set of patients available when we process . for
the kth patient and J ′k be the set of patients available when we process .
′ for the kth patient
where k = 1, . . . , rc˜. For k = 1, Jk = I(3) and J
′
k = I
′(3). By definition, Jk+1 = Jk \ {ik} and
J ′k+1 = J
′
k \ {i′k}.
We show that
(a) Jk \ J ′k ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c,
(b) if c˜ = u, i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk, τ(i′) 6= c, and i ∈ Jk, then i′ pi i,
(c) if c˜ 6= u, i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk, τ(i′) 6= c, and i ∈ Jk, then (Jk ∪ J ′k) ∩ Ic˜ = ∅ and i′ pi i
(d) if c˜ 6= u, then (J ′k \ Jk) ∩ Ic˜ = ∅.
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by mathematical induction on k. These three claims trivially hold for k = 1 by Statements 2
and 3 in Lemma 6.
Fix k. In the inductive step, assume that Statements (a), (b), (c), and (d) hold for k.
Consider k + 1. If Jk+1 = J
′
k+1, then the statements trivially hold. Assume that Jk+1 6= J ′k+1
which implies that J` 6= J ′` for ` = 1, . . . , k. There are four cases depending on which sets ik and
i′k belong to. We consider each case separately.
Case 1: ik ∈ Jk \ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k ∩ Jk. When |{i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk : τ(i′) 6= c}| ≥ 1, i′k ∈ J ′k \ Jk by
Statements (b) and (c) for k. Therefore, |{i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk : τ(i′) 6= c}| = 0. Furthermore,
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = J ′k \ Jk
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = ((Jk \ J ′k) \ {ik}) ∪ {i′k}.
Since |J ′k| = |Jk| and J ′k 6= Jk, we get |J ′k \ Jk| ≥ 1. Therefore, J ′k \ Jk has at least one
category-c patient because |{i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk : τ(i′) 6= c}| = 0. Moreover, this patient has higher
priority with respect to pic˜ than any other category-c patient in J
′
k ∩ Jk because the former
patient is chosen under . and the latter is not, so i′k cannot be category c. Therefore, Statement
(a) for k+ 1 follows from Statement (a) for k. Statements (b) and (c) trivially hold for k+ 1 as
well because
{i′ ∈ J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 : τ(i′) 6= c} = {i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk : τ(i′) 6= c} = ∅.
Statement (d) for k + 1 follows from Statement (d) for k.
Case 2: ik ∈ Jk \ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k \ Jk. Then
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = (J ′k \ Jk) \ {i′k}
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = (Jk \ J ′k) \ {ik}.
Since Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 ⊆ Jk \ J ′k, Statement (a) for k+ 1 follows from Statement (a) for k. Likewise,
Statements (b), (c), and (d) for k + 1 follow from the corresponding statements for k because
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 ⊆ J ′k \ Jk, J ′k+1 ∪ Jk+1 ⊆ J ′k ∪ Jk, and Jk+1 ⊆ Jk.
Case 3: ik ∈ Jk ∩ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k ∩ Jk. In this case, ik = i′k, then
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = J ′k \ Jk
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = Jk \ J ′k.
In this case, Statements (a), (b), (c), and (d) for k + 1 follow from their respective statements
for k.
Case 4: ik ∈ Jk ∩ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k \ Jk. In this case,
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = ((J ′k \ Jk) \ {i′k}) ∪ {ik}
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and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = Jk \ J ′k.
Statement (a) for k + 1 follows from Statement (a) for k trivially.
Statement (b) for k + 1 follows from ik pi i for any i ∈ Jk+1 and also from Statement (b) for
k.
To show Statement (d) for k + 1, suppose that c˜ 6= u. Then by Statement (d) for k, J ′k \ Jk
does not have a category-c˜ patient. Since i′k ∈ J ′k \ Jk, this implies that there are no category-
c˜ patients in J ′k. Therefore, ik does not have category c˜. We conclude that J
′
k+1 \ Jk+1 =
((J ′k \ Jk) \ {i′k})∪{ik} does not have a category c˜ patient, which is the Statement (d) for k+ 1.
To show Statement (c) for k + 1, suppose that c˜ 6= u, i′ ∈ J ′k+1 \ Jk+1, τ(i′) 6= c, and
i ∈ Jk+1. If i′ 6= ik, then i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk since J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = ((J ′k \ Jk) \ {i′k}) ∪ {ik} and Statement
(c) for k + 1 follows from Statement (c) for k because i ∈ Jk+1 ⊆ Jk. Otherwise, suppose
that i′ = ik. By Statement (d) for k + 1, i′ does not have category c˜, which implies that there
are no category-c˜ patients in Jk; this in turn implies there are no category-c˜ patients in Jk+1
since Jk+1 ⊆ Jk. Furthermore, by Statement (d) for k + 1, there are no category-c˜ patients in
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1. We conclude that there are no category-c˜ patients in J ′k+1 ∪ Jk+1. Finally, i′ pic˜ i
for any i ∈ Jk+1 = Jk \ {i′} and since there are no category-c˜ patients in J ′k+1 ∪ Jk+1 we get
i′ pi i.
Since I(4) = Jrc˜ and I
′(4) = J ′rc˜ , Statement 2 in Lemma 7 follows from Statement (a) and
Statement 3 in Lemma 7 follows from Statements (b) and (c).
Lemma 8. Suppose that c ∈ C \ {u} and c′, c∗, c˜, cˆ ∈ C \ {c} are different categories. Let I˜ ⊆ I
and ., .′ ∈ ∆({c, c′, c∗, c˜, cˆ}) be such that
• . be such that c′ . c . c∗ . c˜ . cˆ,
• .′ be such that c .′ c′ .′ c∗ .′ c˜ .′ cˆ,
• I(5) = I˜ \ µ(I˜) where µ = ϕI˜.,
• I ′(5) = I˜ \ µ′(I˜) where µ′ = ϕI˜.′, and
• µ(I˜c) ( I˜c.
Then the following results hold:
1. |I(5) \ I ′(5)| = |I ′(5) \ I(5)| and
2. I(5) \ I ′(5) ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c.
Proof. The first statement in Lemma 8 follows as in the proof of the first statement in Lemma
4.
To prove the second statement, we use Lemma 7. Let .ˆ, .ˆ′ ∈ ∆({c, c′, c∗, c˜}) be such that
.ˆ : c′ .ˆ c .ˆ c∗ .ˆ c˜ and .ˆ′ : c .ˆ′ c′ .ˆ′ c∗ .ˆ c˜.
Let I(4) = I˜ \ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜) and I ′(4) = I˜ \ϕI˜.ˆ′(I˜). Then I(5) = I(4)\µ−1(c˜) and I ′(5) = I ′(4)\µ′−1(c˜).
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For both precedence orders . and .′ under the sequential reserve matching procedure, con-
sider the beginning of the fifth step, at which category cˆ is processed. For ., the set of available
patients is I(4). For .′, the set of available patients is I ′(4). If I(4) = I ′(4), then we get
I(5) = I ′(5), which implies all the statements. Therefore, assume that I(4) 6= I ′(4). For every
precedence order, rcˆ patients with the highest priority with respect to picˆ are chosen.
We consider each patient chosen under . and .′ for category cˆ one at a time in sequence with
respect to the priority order picˆ. Since µ(I˜c) ( I˜c, rcˆ patients are matched with cˆ under both
precedence orders. Let ik be the k
th patient chosen under . for cˆ and i′k be the k
th patient chosen
under .′ for cˆ where k = 1, . . . , rcˆ. Let Jk be the set of patients available when we process . for
the kth patient and J ′k be the set of patients available when we process .
′ for the kth patient
where k = 1, . . . , rcˆ. For k = 1, Jk = I(4) and J
′
k = I
′(4). By definition, Jk+1 = Jk \ {ik} and
J ′k+1 = J
′
k \ {i′k}.
We show that
(a) Jk \ J ′k ⊆ I˜ \ I˜c and
(b) if i′ ∈ J ′k \ Jk and i ∈ Jk ∩ I˜c, then i′ picˆ i
by mathematical induction on k. These results trivially hold for k = 1 by Statements 2, 3, and
4 in Lemma 7.
Fix k. In the inductive step, assume that Statements (a) and (b) hold for k. Consider k+ 1.
If Jk+1 = J
′
k+1, then the statements trivially hold. Assume that Jk+1 6= J ′k+1 which implies that
J` 6= J ′` for ` = 1, . . . , k. There are four cases depending on which sets ik and i′k belong to. We
consider each case separately.
Case 1: ik ∈ Jk \ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k ∩ Jk. Then
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = J ′k \ Jk
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) =
(
(Jk \ J ′k) \ {ik}
) ∪ {i′k}.
If i′k ∈ I˜c, then we get a contradiction to Statement (b) for k. Therefore, i′k /∈ I˜c, which implies
that Statement (a) holds for k + 1 by Statement (a) for k and the second displayed equation.
Statement (b) for k + 1 follows trivially from Statement (b) for k, the first displayed equation,
and Jk ⊇ Jk+1.
Case 2: ik ∈ Jk \ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k \ Jk. Then
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = (J ′k \ Jk) \ {i′k}
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = (Jk \ J ′k) \ {ik}.
In this case, Statements (a) and (b) for k+ 1 follow trivially from the corresponding statements
for k.
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Case 3: ik ∈ Jk ∩ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k ∩ Jk. In this case, ik = i′k, then
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = J ′k \ Jk
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = Jk \ J ′k.
In this case, Statements (a) and (b) for k + 1 follow trivially from the corresponding statement
for k.
Case 4: ik ∈ Jk ∩ J ′k and i′k ∈ J ′k \ Jk. In this case,
J ′k+1 \ Jk+1 = (J ′k \ {i′k}) \ (Jk \ {ik}) = ((J ′k \ Jk) \ {i′k}) ∪ {ik}
and
Jk+1 \ J ′k+1 = (Jk \ {ik}) \ (J ′k \ {i′k}) = Jk \ J ′k.
Then Statement (a) for k + 1 follows from Statement (a) for k. Furthermore, ik picˆ i for any
i ∈ Jk+1, which together with Statement (b) for k imply Statement (b) for k + 1.
Since I(5) = Jrcˆ and I
′(5) = J ′rcˆ , Statement 2 in Lemma 8 follows from Statement (a).
Proof of Proposition 3. Let |C| ≤ 5. Let C∗ = {c∗ ∈ C : c∗ . c′} be the set of categories
processed before c′ under . and before c under .′. The orders of categories in C∗ are the same
with respect to . and .′. Thus, just before category c′ is processed under . and c is processed
under .′, the same patients are matched in both sequential reserve matching procedures. Let I˜
be the set of patients that are available at this point in either procedure.
Let .ˆ be the incomplete precedence order on C\C∗ that processes categories in the same order
as in .. Likewise, let .ˆ′ be the incomplete precedence order on C \ C∗ that processes categories
in the same order as in .′.
If ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜c) = I˜c then the result is proven. Therefore, assume that ϕ
I˜
.ˆ(I˜c) ( I˜c in the rest of
the proof. Let k = |C \ C∗| be the number of remaining categories.
• If k = 2, then by Lemmas 4 and 5, we obtain ϕI˜
.ˆ′(I˜c) ⊆ ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜c).
• If k = 3, then by Lemma 6, we obtain ϕI˜
.ˆ′(I˜c) ⊆ ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜c).
• If k = 4, then by Lemma 7, we obtain ϕI˜
.ˆ′(I˜c) ⊆ ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜c).
• If k = 5, then by Lemma 8, we obtain ϕI˜
.ˆ′(I˜c) ⊆ ϕI˜.ˆ(I˜c).
These imply that
ϕ.′(Ic) ⊆ ϕ.(Ic)
completing the proof.
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A.4 A Polynomial Time Method for Smart Reserve Matching Procedure
Consider the following algorithm for any n:
Step 0. Find a matching that is maximal and complies with eligibility requirements by temporarily
deeming that a patient i ∈ I is eligible for a category c ∈ C \ {u} if and only if i ∈
Ic, and no patient is eligible for unreserved category u. This is known as a bipartite
maximum cardinality matching problem in graph theory and many augmenting alternating
path algorithms (such as those by Hopcroft and Karp, 1973; Karzanov, 1973) can solve
it in polynomial time. The solution finds the maximum number of patients who can be
matched with a preferential treatment category that they are a beneficiaries of. Denote
the number of patients matched by this matching as nb.
Step 1. Let Ju0 = ∅, J0 = ∅. Fix parameters κ   > 0 such that  < 1 and κ > |I| would work.
For k = 1, . . . , |I| we repeat the following substep given Juk−1, Jk−1:
Step 1.(k). Suppose ik is the patient who is prioritized k
th in I according to pi.
i. if |Juk−1| < n continue with (i.A) and otherwise continue with (ii).
A. Temporarily deem all patients in Juk−1 ∪ {ik} eligible only for category u and
all other patients eligible only for the categories in C \ {u} that they are
beneficiaries of.
B. for every pair (i, x) ∈ I × C ∪ {∅} define a weight Wi,c ∈ R as follows:
• If x ∈ C and i is temporarily eligible for x as explained in (i.A),
– if i ∈ Juk−1 ∪ Jk−1, then define Wi,x := κ,
– otherwise, define Wi,x := .
• If x ∈ C and i is not temporarily eligible for x as explained in (i.A), define
Wi,x := −.
• If x = ∅, define Wi,x := 0.
C. Solve the following assignment problem to find a matching
σ ∈ arg max
µ∈M
∑
i∈I
Wi,µ(i)
using a polynomial algorithm such as the Hungarian algorithm (Kuhn, 1955).
D. If |σ(I)| = nb + |Juk−1|+ 1 then define
Juk := J
u
k−1 ∪ {ik} and Jk := Jk−1,
and go to Step 1.(k + 1) if k < |I| and Step 2 if k = |I|.
E. Otherwise, go to (ii).
ii. Repeat (i) with the exception that ik is temporarily deemed eligible only for the
categories in C \ {u} that she is a beneficiary of in Part (ii.A). Parts (ii.B) and
(ii.C) are the same as Parts (i.B) and (i.C), respectively, with the exception that
weights are constructed with respect to the eligibility construction in (ii.A). Parts
(ii.D) and (ii.E) are as follows:
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D. If |σ(I)| = nb + |Juk−1| and σ(i) 6= ∅ for all i ∈ Jk−1 ∪ {ik}, then define
Juk := J
u
k−1 and Jk := Jk−1 ∪ {ik},
and go to Step 1.(k + 1) if k < |I| and Step 2 if k = |I|.
E. Otherwise,
Juk := J
u
k−1 and Jk := Jk−1,
and go to Step 1.(k + 1) if k < |I| and Step 2 if k = |I|.
Step 2. (a) Find a matching σ as follows:
i. Temporarily deem all patients in Ju|I| eligible only for category u, all patients in
J|I| eligible only for the categories in C \ {u} that they are beneficiaries of, and
all other patients ineligible for all categories.
ii. Find a maximal matching σ among all matchings that comply with the temporary
eligibility requirements defined in (i) using a polynomial augmenting alternating
paths algorithm (for example see Hopcroft and Karp, 1973; Karzanov, 1973).
(b) Modify σ as follows:
One at a time assign the remaining units unmatched in σ to the remaining highest
priority patient in I \ (Ju|I| ∪ J|I|) who is eligible for the category of the assigned unit
in the real problem in the following order:
i. the remaining units of the preferential treatment categories in C \ {u} in an
arbitrary order, and
ii. the remaining units of the unreserved category u.
Step 3. Define
InS := σ(I).
Matching σ is a smart reserve matching with n unreserved category units processed first.
The difference between this algorithm and the procedure we gave in the text is that we do not
have to construct the matching sets Mk in every Step 1(k), as this is an NP-complete problem
to solve. Instead, we solve appropriately constructed polynomial-time optimization problems in
|I| in each step to see whether desired matching exists in each step. As there are polynomial
number of steps in |I|, the resulting algorithm becomes polynomial.
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Appendix B Cutoffs in Real-life Applications
 
 
 
Figure A1.  Examples of Cutoffs in Reserve Systems from Chicago’s Affirmative Action System in 2020  
and Indian Civil Service Assignment in 2012 
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